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I General Introduction 
This cumulative dissertation aims to contribute to a better understanding of price transmission 
and market integration in Swiss agricultural and food markets. It contains three articles dealing 
with quantitative analyses of market integration and spatial and vertical price transmission. This 
work contributes to an extensive strand of price transmission literature that analyzes how prices 
are passed on between markets, either spatially, i.e., between geographically separated markets, 
or vertically, i.e., between different stages of a processing chain (for recent reviews see, e.g., 
Lloyd 2017, von Cramon-Taubadel 2017). In this introduction, I argue why analyzing such 
interrelationships and dynamics of prices is particularly interesting in the case of Swiss agri-
cultural and food markets, followed by an overview of the three articles. 
1 About Switzerland’s agricultural and food markets 
Despite a gradual market opening over the past 20 years, Switzerland seems to remain an island 
of high and stable agricultural and food prices in the middle of Europe. This particularity has 
been part of both public perception (Sax and Weder 2009, Rudolph et al. 2015) and policy 
debate (OECD 1992, SECO 2008, OECD 2019) for decades. 
Indeed, numbers provide evidence for the existence of such a “high price island” as Switzerland 
is often labeled (Eichenberger 2005). The country has the highest consumer and producer price 
indices in Europe, and for food and agricultural products, the difference to neighboring coun-
tries is even higher than on aggregate level, with a Swiss food price level of 66% above EU-15 
average (Eurostat 2019). Although there is consensus on the high price level, it is not clear 
whether this Swiss (food) price island really is as isolated and pricing as rigid as perceived. 
There have rarely been any empirical analyses on how international prices influence Swiss ag-
ricultural and food prices. To date, there is only one published case study on spatial price trans-
mission for wheat, which found no or only very weak links to international markets, depending 
on the type of wheat (bread vs. feed wheat) and the respective policy setting (Esposti and Lis-
torti 2018). With its particular reference and entry price system, the study’s results cannot read-
ily be transferred to other products. Also insights from other countries are only of limited use-
fulness, given the particular Swiss country characteristics, especially the policy setting and 
market structure. 
Until the 1990s, Swiss agricultural markets were largely under state control, based on public 
price and volume guarantee schemes. After Switzerland became a member of the World Trade 
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Organization in 1995, and following the Uruguay round, markets have gradually opened up 
(Koch 2002). Yet, in many areas subsidies and border protection remain high, with the explicit 
aim to “protect” the domestic market, i.e., to stabilize Swiss prices by reducing price volatility 
coming from international markets, especially on producer level (Loi et al. 2016). 
Therefore, the first part of this thesis deals with spatial price transmission between the Swiss 
and the surrounding EU market. The focus will be on the milk market for several reasons. 
Firstly, milk is the most important agricultural product in Switzerland in many ways. Milk, 
cows and cheese are closely linked to the Swiss alpine identity, and the milk market contributes 
to about 25% of the national agricultural production value (SBV 2013). Furthermore, there are 
large trade flows of milk products; in 2017, more than 800 million tons whole milk equivalent 
(WME) were exported and around 450 million WME were imported (SMP 2019). Whereas 
hard cheese such as Emmentaler and Gruyère are the major export products, other cheese types 
such as soft and cream cheese are imported in large volumes. The milk market also provides an 
interesting case study because Switzerland applies a number of different border protection pol-
icies for milk products (Haller 2014, FOAG 2017). In the milk market, the stepwise liberaliza-
tion process has resulted in a variety of border protection measures for different dairy products 
present today: tariff rate quotas (TRQs), single tariffs and a full free trade agreement with the 
EU for cheese (Koch 2002, Haller 2014). Such different trade barriers for joint products pro-
duced from raw milk may have an influence on price transmission and market integration with 
Switzerland’s trade partners. 
Moreover, the Swiss milk market is characterized by a particular market structure: At the farm 
level, there are more than 20,000 producers (SMP 2019). In 2017, about 44% of all Swiss farms 
engaged in milk production, mainly family-run small-scale farms with on average 25 cows 
(TSM et al. 2017). The raw milk then goes into two processing lines: About 43% is processed 
into cheese, and the remaining 57% is processed into other, non-cheese dairy products (SMP 
2019). In cheese processing, small, artisanal processors dominate the market, with some hun-
dred processors engaged (Haller 2014). These small, artisanal processors mainly produce hard 
and semi-hard cheese from non-pasteurized raw milk, subject to strict quality criteria. Some 
industrial-type cheese from pasteurized milk is also produced by large dairy processors. How-
ever, the remaining non-cheese dairy processing is highly industrialized and has undergone a 
concentration process and several mergers, with four large processors remaining (Flury et al. 
2014, SMP 2019). Especially for perishable and bulky raw milk, with no storage or transporta-
tion possibilities, these processors might possess a spatial oligopsony power and consequently 
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price setting power (Sexton 1990). The retail sector, too, is highly concentrated and often de-
scribed as a duopoly, because two retailers account for more than 70% of the market share 
(FDFA 2017). 
Given this background, and especially the differences in market structures between cheese and 
dairy processing, a part of this dissertation focuses on vertical price transmission along Swiss 
cheese and dairy chains. 
2 Overview of the articles 
The first article, “Protecting the Swiss milk market from foreign price shocks: Public border 
protection vs. quality differentiation” (chapter II), focuses on spatial price transmission be-
tween the EU and Switzerland. In Switzerland, different trade policies apply for different milk 
products: Dairy products such as milk powder and butter are still subject to tariffs and TRQs, 
whereas cheese trade with the EU is fully liberalized. At the same time, cheese and other dairy 
products differ regarding their degree of qualitative differentiation. Butter and milk powder are 
generally considered homogeneous bulk commodities, produced from pasteurized milk. Swiss 
cheese products, on the other hand, are more heterogeneous, with a large variety of types, 
brands and regional restrictions. This is especially the case for the typical Swiss hard and semi-
hard raw milk cheese, such as Emmentaler and Gruyère. 
This situation leads us to the following research questions: How strong is the influence of neigh-
boring EU prices on Swiss prices for different milk products, both for the processed products 
and for the underlying raw milk producer prices? How does this influence differ for products 
with different levels of (a) protective trade policies and (b) qualitative differentiation? 
To assess these questions, we analyze price transmission between Germany and Switzerland 
for dairy products (whole milk powder, skimmed milk powder, butter) and for cheese (hard and 
semi-hard cheese). We use monthly average wholesale prices and raw milk producer prices in 
the different processing channels from January 2000 to May 2017. Applying cointegration anal-
ysis and vector error correction models, we compare how fully and at what speed price devel-
opments in Germany are transmitted to Switzerland. We choose Germany because it is a major 
trade partner for milk products and a good representative of the overall EU price development 
(Benedek et al. 2017, FOAG 2017). 
The third chapter presents the second manuscript, “Vertical price transmission in Swiss dairy 
and cheese value chains.” This article complements the first article by investigating the vertical 
price pass-through within Switzerland in both the dairy and the cheese segment. Because milk 
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is the most important agricultural product for farm income, milk producer prices, and how more 
value can be retained at this stage, have received quite some attention (SBV 2013, Reviron et al. 
2017). However, the price linkages between the different stages of the dairy and cheese value 
chains have not yet been analyzed systematically and quantified. Therefore, we investigate ver-
tical price transmission along Swiss value chains. In particular, we distinguish between the 
“artisanal” cheese and the “industrial” dairy processing systems, as they differ in terms of struc-
ture, industry concentration and value chain governance. 
The research questions therefore are: How fully and how quickly are prices passed on along 
Swiss cheese and dairy value chains? Are there any asymmetries regarding price increases and 
decreases? Do the different characteristics of the Swiss dairy and cheese processing chains have 
an influence on price transmission? 
The study is based on monthly price data on farm gate, wholesale, export and retail levels from 
2004 until 2018. For all price pairs within a processing line, linear Johansen cointegration and 
threshold cointegration tests are applied (Johansen 1988, Balke and Fomby 1997, Enders and 
Granger 1998) to test for long-run relationships between prices. Depending on the outcome, 
different models are chosen to estimate the pairwise price transmission and price adjustment 
processes. For linearly cointegrated price pairs, vector error correction models (VECM) are 
estimated. For threshold-integrated price pairs, and to account for asymmetries, threshold au-
toregressive (TAR) and momentum threshold autoregressive (MTAR) models are specified, 
following an approach by Enders and Siklos (2001). For non-cointegrated price pairs, vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models in first differences are estimated to study short-run dependencies 
between the prices. 
The fourth chapter presents the third manuscript, “Market integration and market efficiency 
under seasonal tariff rate quotas.” Whereas the first two articles focus on price data and price 
transmission processes, here the scope is extended to the analysis of physical market integra-
tion. In this article, price information is combined with data on trade costs and trade flows. As 
noted by Barrett (1996), combining data on prices and trade activities allows better understand-
ing of the interactions of different markets in the agricultural sector. This is especially true for 
markets with strongly seasonal trade patterns, as for the case of many Swiss fruits and vegeta-
bles for which seasonal TRQs apply during the domestic supply season. TRQs are a popular 
instrument to control market access, particularly for politically sensitive agricultural products 
(Beckman et al. 2017, WTO 2019). Also in Switzerland, most agro-food imports are regulated 
by TRQs, covering meat, milk products, potatoes, bread cereals and wine. Non-seasonal TRQs 
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have received considerable research attention, and their effects on prices and trade patterns are 
quite well understood (e.g., Skully 2001). Less is known about the effects of seasonal TRQs on 
fresh fruits and vegetables, which are applied not only in Switzerland but also in the EU, Ice-
land, Norway and South Korea (WTO 2019). In Switzerland, these seasonal TRQs cover 60 
products, and hence almost all fresh fruits and vegetables that are grown domestically in rele-
vant quantities (Swiss Federal Council 2008, Swisscofel 2018). These TRQs are in effect only 
during domestic harvest seasons. In the rest of the year, when there is no local produce to be 
protected from imports, no or only low tariffs apply. Given the wide application of seasonal 
TRQs and the lack of previous empirical studies, we analyze how this policy instrument affects 
market integration and market efficiency using the example of Italian tomato imports. The ar-
ticle aims to answer the following research questions: 
How are the Swiss and the Italian tomato markets physically integrated under the seasonal TRQ 
system, i.e., how large are the trade volumes inside and outside the administered periods? How 
does the seasonal TRQ system affect market efficiency, i.e., are markets in an efficient equilib-
rium, where excess rents are extinct by competitive pressure, or are there rents created for im-
porters holding quota shares? 
To study how seasonal TRQs applied by Switzerland affect Italian–Swiss tomato trade, market 
integration and rents throughout the year, we use a parity bounds model (PBM) approach, first 
suggested by Spiller and Huang (1986). We follow an extended version of the PBM by Barrett 
and Li (2002) and use detailed weekly customs data on trade flows, tariff costs and prices from 
2011 until 2015. With the help of the PBM, we can identify different cases or “regimes” re-
garding physical market integration and market efficiency. We then estimate the probability of 
observing each of these regimes at a given point in time, and how this relates to the administered 
and non-administered TRQ periods. 
The three articles in the following chapters II to IV form the core of this thesis. The final chapter 
V summarizes the results, draws conclusions and points out the need for further research. 
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Lloyd, T. (2017). Forty years of price transmission research in the food industry: insights, chal-
lenges and prospects. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 68(1), 3–21. 
Loi, A., Esposti, R., Gentile, M., Aragrande, M., Bruni, M., Berisio, S., and Saguatti, A. (2016). 
Policy evaluation of tariff rate quotas. Report mandated by the Swiss Federal Office for 
Agriculture. Areté, Bologna. 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (1992). Economic Sur-
veys: Switzerland 1991/1992. OECD Publishing, Paris. 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2019). Agricultural Pol-
icy Monitoring and Evaluation 2019. OECD Publishing, Paris. 
Reviron, S., Python, P., Gresset, F., Estève, M., and Bänninger, A. (2017). Wertverteilung in 
der Wertschöpfungskette. Schlussbericht. Nr. 3177. Agridea, Lausanne. Available at 
https://agridea.abacuscity.ch/de/~2044, last accessed 7 August 2019. 
I   General Introduction 
8 
Rudolph, T., Nagengast, L., and Nitsch, F. (2015). Einkaufstourismus Schweiz 2015: Eine Stu-
die zu den aktuellen Entwicklungen des Einkaufstourismus. Forschungszentrum für Han-
delsmanagement, St. Gallen. ISBN 978-3-906057-16-3. 
Sax, C., and Weder, R. (2009). How to explain the high prices in Switzerland? Swiss Journal 
of Economics and Statistics, 145(4), 463–483. 
SBV (Schweizerischer Bauernverband) (2013). Der Schweizer Milchmarkt. 056-462 51 11. 
Available at https://www.sbv-usp.ch/filead-
min/sbvuspch/07_Preise/milch/131204_Milch 
markt_Schweiz_de.pdf, last accessed 7 August 2019. 
SECO (Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs) (2008). Preisinsel Schweiz. Berichte in 
Erfüllung des Postulates David (05.3816). SECO, Bern. 
Sexton, R. J. (1990). Imperfect competition in agricultural markets and the role of cooperatives: 
a spatial analysis. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 72(3), 709–720. 
Skully, D. W. (2001). Economics of tariff-rate quota administration. US Department of Agricul-
ture, Economic Research Service. 
SMP (Swiss Milk Producers) (2019). Schweizer Milchwirtschaft in Zahlen 2018/2019. Availa-
ble at https://api.swissmilk.ch/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/brochure-smp-schweizer-
milch 
wirtschaft-in-zahlen-2018-2019-195000-de.pdf, last accessed 7 August 2019. 
Spiller, P. T., and Huang, C. J. (1986). On the extent of the market: wholesale gasoline in the 
northeastern United States. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(2), 131–145. 
Swiss Federal Council (2008). Ordinance on Rates of Duty for Goods in Trade with Member 
States of EFTA and the EU (Free Trade Ordinance 1, SR 632.421.0, 18 June 2008). 
Available at https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/official-compilation/2008/3519.pdf, last ac-
cessed 7 August 2019. 
Swisscofel (2018). Guide réglementation d’importation fruits et légumes. Available at 
http://www.swisscofel.ch/wAssets/docs/news/Leitfaden-2019.pdf, last accessed 7 Au-
gust 2019. 
I   General Introduction 
9 
TSM (TSM Treuhand GmbH), SMP (Swiss Milk Producers), SCM (Switzerland Cheese Mar-
keting), and Agristat (2017). Milchstatistik der Schweiz 2016. TSM, Bern, September 
2017. ISSN 1423- 4548. 
von Cramon-Taubadel, S. (2017). The analysis of market integration and price transmission — 
results and implications in an African context. Agrekon, 56(2), 83–96. 
WTO (World Trade Organization). Tariff Download Facility (2019). Available at http://tar-
iffdata.wto.org/, last accessed 7 August 2019 
II   Protecting the Swiss milk market from foreign price shocks: Public border protection vs. quality differentiation 
10 
II Protecting the Swiss milk market from foreign price shocks: 
Public border protection vs. quality differentiation 
Authors: Judith Hillen und Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel1 
Published in Agribusiness (online since 1 March 2019) 
Abstract 
Switzerland applies a number of different border protection policies for milk products. While 
dairy products such as butter and milk powder are still subject to tariffs and tariff rate quotas, 
cheese trade with the EU is fully liberalized. To understand how such different levels of pro-
tection affect spatial price transmission, we analyze price transmission between Germany and 
Switzerland for several products at the wholesale level, and for raw milk producer prices. We 
find that not the level of border protection determines the degree and speed of price transmis-
sion, but rather the qualitative differentiation of the Swiss products. While prices of tariff-pro-
tected dairy products are influenced by German price developments, cheese prices are not. Also 
at the producer level, milk prices for cheese processing are less strongly linked to foreign prices 
than milk prices for industrial dairy production. Our results suggest that for small high-income 
countries such as Switzerland, promoting high-quality products and hence reducing interna-
tional substitutability alleviates international price pressure more than protection via tariffs. 
[EconLit Classifications: Q11, Q13, Q18]. 
KEYWORDS: Milk prices, price transmission, Switzerland, trade policy 
                                                 
1 This paper is coauthored by Prof. Dr. Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel. My contributions are the research idea, 
conception and data analysis, as well as the writing of the article. The coauthor supported me throughout this 
process with many valuable comments and suggestions, and contributed to the revision of the article. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the 1990s, the Swiss milk market has gradually been opened, resulting in many parallel 
border protection policies for different dairy products (Haller 2014, FOAG 2017). In particular, 
there is a distinction between the liberalized “yellow line” (cheese products) and the still pro-
tected “white line” (other milk products, such as butter and milk powder). While cheese trade 
with the EU is fully liberalized, industrial dairy products such as milk powder and butter are 
subject to tariffs and tariff rate quotas (TRQs). 
Yet, is it not well understood how such different types and levels of protection for products 
jointly produced from a single commodity influence spatial price transmission. This is valid for 
the respective products and for raw milk producer prices. Given that globally milk has become 
one of the most volatile commodities (IFCN 2011), it is relevant to understand how foreign 
price developments influence domestic wholesale and producer prices in such a setting. 
There is a large body of literature on spatial price transmission, including some studies on milk 
markets. These studies mostly focus on dry milk product prices in the aggregate regions EU, 
USA, and Oceania and find spatial long-run linkages among these three regions (Fousekis and 
Trachanas 2016, Newton 2016, Zhang et al. 2017). Studies looking at fluid milk prices find 
some spatial price transmission from global markets to smaller countries, such as Panama 
(Acosta et al. 2014) and the Netherlands (Carvalho et al. 2015). Testing for raw milk market 
integration among 20 EU member states, Bakucs et al. (2015) find only 35% of the price pairs 
to be cointegrated. Yet, these studies provide limited insights into the situation in Switzerland 
for which, to date, there is only one case study on spatial price transmission: For Swiss wheat, 
Esposti and Listorti (2018) find no or only weak links to international markets, depending on 
the type (bread vs. feed wheat) and the respective policy setting. Since Switzerland applies a 
particular reference and entry price system for wheat, this study’s results cannot be transferred 
to the milk market. 
The aim of our study is to understand to what extent foreign price developments influence Swiss 
milk and dairy prices. We analyze spatial price transmission between Switzerland and its major 
trade partner Germany for dairy products that are subject to different trade policies. We assess 
wholesale prices for tariff-protected industrial dairy products (butter and milk powder) and lib-
eralized cheese products (hard- and semi-hard cheese). In addition, we analyze spatial producer 
price transmission for raw milk intended for either dairy- or cheese-processing. 
We find weak or no spatial price transmission at the wholesale level, but strong linkages on the 
producer level. Hence, while tariffs and tariff rate quotas appear to “protect” domestic prices 
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for the respective products at the wholesale level, they do not hinder price transmission for the 
input raw milk. In fact, the price of raw milk intended for processing into (protected) white-line 
products is more dependent on German price developments than raw milk that is used to pro-
duce (liberalized) cheese, and qualitatively differentiated raw milk for artisanal cheese produc-
tion or from organic production is the least dependent of all. 
Our results suggest that qualitative differentiation can protect domestic producer prices from 
foreign price shock at least as well or even better than traditional border measures. Especially 
for a small high-income country such as Switzerland, positioning domestic products in high-
quality, differentiated product segments may be a more efficient way to remain competitive and 
to alleviate price pressure. While tariffs aim to disturb the price relationship between foreign 
and domestic products, qualitative differentiation reduces the substitutability between the prod-
ucts. In addition, differentiation does not generate the net welfare losses associated with border 
protection. While our analysis highlights the role that differentiation can play, it only provides 
a partial explanation of the formation of market prices and ultimately price transmission. Since 
we work with aggregate price data, we cannot account for all of the differences in the function-
ing and structure of the supply chains in the analyzed countries. 
2 Characteristics of the Swiss Milk Market 
In 2016, about 41% of Swiss raw milk was processed into yellow-line cheese products, and the 
remaining 59% were used for white-line products such as butter and milk powder. Both the 
overall production and the product shares are subject to some seasonal variation, but have re-
mained stable over the past years, with a slight increase in cheese production since the early 
2000s (FOAG 2017, TSM et al. 2017). 
2.1 Processing channels 
The processing channels for cheese and other dairy products are quite strictly separated in Swit-
zerland. Raw milk intended for the white line is generally bought by large industrial dairy pro-
cessors or producer organizations as a homogeneous bulk product (Mann and Gairing 2011, 
Flury et al. 2014). For such standardized dairy products, price and volume are decisive compe-
tition factors (Stræte 2008). 
Farmers who supply to the yellow-line cheese dairies often face specific quality requirements, 
especially silage-free feeding for raw milk cheese production. Cheese is produced by several 
hundred regional and artisanal dairies of different sizes (Haller 2014). Some industrial cheese 
types are also produced by the large dairy processors. 
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2.2 Policy framework 
These differences between the yellow and the white line are also reflected in border policies. 
White-line dairy products are protected by means of tariffs and TRQs, while the cheese market 
is liberalized. This situation developed as a result of gradual liberalization steps since the 1990s. 
Before then, Swiss milk producers and processors were completely insulated from price vola-
tility and world market developments, as the market was based on public price and volume 
guarantee schemes. After Switzerland became a WTO member in 1995, and following the Uru-
guay round, its markets for different milk products were subject to different degrees of liberal-
ization, leading to today’s situation (Koch 2002). 
White-line products are still protected by single tariffs or TRQs, fixed per weight (CHF/100kg), 
not per value of the imported good. To make tariffs comparable, we calculate ad valorem equiv-
alents (AVE) in percentage terms. However, these AVEs can vary due to changes in foreign 
price developments and exchange rates, even if the nominal tariff stays the same. 
Table 1 summarizes the border policies in effect for the products that will be included in our 
empirical analysis. For skimmed milk powder (SMP), there is a regular single tariff (72% 
AVE). For butter and whole milk powder (WMP), TRQs are in place, with low tariffs for fixed 
yearly quotas (5% AVE for 100t for butter, 13% AVE for 300t for WMP). These quotas are 
generally fully exploited. Out-of-quota tariffs for butter and WMP are 341% and 171%, respec-
tively, which is prohibitively high and makes both quotas binding. For more details on the Swiss 
TRQ system, see Loi et al. (2016). 
Table 1: Swiss border protection policy type and level for selected dairy products 
Product Policy type In-Quota AVE 
Out-of-quota / 
Single tariff AVE 
Butter TRQ 5% (100t p.a.) 341% 
WMP TRQ 13% (300t p.a.) 171% 
SMP Single tariff n/a 72% 
Cheese Free trade (EU) n/a 0% 
Source: Own calculations, based on FOAG/customs data 
AVE = ad valorem equivalent; WMP = Whole milk powder; SMP = Skimmed milk 
powder; TRQ = Tariff Rate Quota; n/a = not applicable 
 
As a result of prohibitive tariff protection, Switzerland, with a few small exceptions, does not 
import unprocessed raw milk. The exceptions are Liechtenstein and a defined border zone close 
to Geneva, which are exempted from tariffs (Agricultural import regulation, Art. 35.1). Also, 
dairy products and cheese need to contain 100% Swiss milk to be labeled as “Swiss” (Trade 
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Mark Protection Act, Art. 48b). Hence, there is no direct trade and arbitrage opportunity for 
raw milk. 
For cheese, which is Switzerland’s most important dairy export product, a free trade agreement 
with the EU is in place (Haller 2014). This liberalization took place gradually, starting in 2002 
and resulting in full free trade after July 2007. Since this market opening, both imports and 
exports of cheese have increased (FOAG 2017). To offset the expected liberalization effects on 
milk producer revenues, a government payment for milk processed into cheese was introduced 
in 1999. Starting with 0.20 CHF per kilogram of raw milk, the payment was gradually reduced 
to 0.15 CHF between 2004 and 2007. This support is paid to cheese processors once the raw 
milk has been processed into cheese. The cheese dairies are required to forward this subsidy to 
the milk producers. Yet, it is estimated that only about two-thirds of it are actually passed on to 
the farmers (see Finger et al. 2017 for more details). 
Further policy events were the abolishment of the milk production quota in Switzerland (in May 
2009) and in the EU (in April 2015). The Swiss public quota system ended gradually with long 
transition periods, and was followed by a private-law quota system that continues to control 
production quantities (Haller 2014, FOAG 2017). This explains why abolishment of the quota 
did not lead to increased production and falling prices (Mann and Gairing 2011), as was the 
case in the EU. 
Because of these gradual, recent and partly overlapping policy changes, it is not possible to 
conduct rigorous evaluations of individual changes. Instead, we include these changes as ex-
planatory or dummy variables in robustness checks of the later analysis to get insights into the 
direction and significance of their effects on prices. 
2.3 Trade situation 
Switzerland is a net exporter of aggregate milk products with a self-sufficiency of 117%. 
Cheese is the most important export product (TSM et al. 2017). Table 2 shows that more than 
half of Swiss hard cheese production is exported, including well-known specialties such as 
Emmentaler and Gruyère. Simultaneously, there are notable imports especially of more indus-
trial types of cheese such as fresh cheese and mozzarella (33.9% and 20.8% of the domestic 
production volume respectively). 
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Table 2: Relative import and export shares, as percentage of domestic production 
volume (average for years 2000 – 2016)  
Product Policy type Import (%) Export (%) 
Fluid milk TRQ 5.0*  0.8 
Butter TRQ 4.0 5.4 
WMP TRQ 3.6 11.7 
SMP Single tariff 2.4 45.0 
Cheese (all) free trade 24.2 32.4 
Fresh cheese/curd free trade 33.9 6.9 
Mozzarella free trade 20.8 10.8 
Hard cheese free trade 3.1 51.6 
* imports only from free trade zone (Geneva) and Liechtenstein 
Source: Own calculations, based on FOAG data  
Because of trade-restricting border policies, imports account for less than 5% of domestic pro-
duction volume for all non-cheese dairy products. The only notable white-line export good is 
SMP, for which 45% of domestic production is exported. 
The EU is by far Switzerland’s largest trade partner, receiving about 80% of its cheese exports 
(TSM et al. 2017). Hence, the following analysis is exclusively concerned with trade policies 
between Switzerland and EU member states, not vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
2.4 Product characteristics and differentiation 
White-line dairy products such as butter and milk powder are generally considered homogene-
ous bulk commodities, produced from pasteurized milk. Yellow-line Swiss cheese products are 
more heterogeneous, with a large variety of types, brands and qualities, especially for the typical 
Swiss hard- and semi-hard raw milk cheese. At the retail level, such product differentiation, 
e.g., through different brands, has been analyzed in previous studies that focus on the vertical 
transmission of milk prices (e.g., Loy et al. 2015, Li et al. 2018). At the producer level however, 
agricultural products such as milk are often classified as undifferentiated, i.e., milk is milk at 
the farm gate. Even though this perception is changing (Grunert 2005), previous price trans-
mission studies only analyze aggregate raw milk prices and neglect the possible effect of quality 
differentiation. 
In our study, we separate price data for raw milk by processing channel: Non-organic milk for 
processing into white-line products, cheese, and artisanal cheese, as well as organic milk. 
Hence, we can derive information about quality characteristics both at the producer and the 
wholesale level. 
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In addition to quality differences between product types, in Switzerland there is evidence of a 
general preference for domestic products. More than 80% of consumers pay attention to “Swiss-
ness” when purchasing cheese and dairy products (FOAG 2015). Some consumer groups dis-
play an additional willingness to pay premium prices for domestic products, as they associate 
Swiss products with higher product quality, food safety, and ecological standards (Bolliger and 
Réviron 2008, Bolliger 2011). Previous studies on industrial goods find that such a consumer 
“home bias” is mainly caused by locational factors, such as geographical distance, tariffs and 
distribution barriers (e.g., Evans 2001, Hillberry and Hummels 2003 and 2008). In our case 
however, it is at least partly due to an inherent preference for domestic agricultural products. 
Food quality is a broad and multi-dimensional concept that involves both producers and con-
sumers perceptions, preferences and requirements (Morris and Young 2000; Callon et al. 2002). 
For our purposes we distinguish between horizontal and vertical quality differentiation. While 
horizontal differentiation just describes a variety of product, for which preferences are purely 
individual (e.g., different cheese brands), vertical quality differentiation implies that a general 
ranking between superior and inferior products can be made based on some objective criteria. 
In our case, this could be the following: At the producer level we consider two attributes to 
contribute to “higher” quality: (a) silage-free feeding, as required for raw milk cheese produc-
tion, and (b) organic production, as opposed to conventional dairy milk production. At the pro-
cessing stage, we define cheese processing, and especially artisanal cheese processing as 
“higher” quality because of the more time-consuming and more costly procedures, compared 
with industrial dairy processing. If products are perceived as qualitatively differentiated, 
whether for the above-named attributes, or because of other, less tangible cognitive or affective 
reasons, this differentiation can alleviate price competition (Rosen 1974, Shaked and Sutton 
1982; Chen et al. 2017). 
Competing via quality differentiation rather than price may be especially feasible in a high-
income and high-cost country such as Switzerland: First, Switzerland is a small market with a 
large demand for high-quality products and the necessary purchasing power to pay for them 
(Bolliger 2011, FOAG 2017). Second, it has the highest average costs of milk exporting nations 
worldwide, which are only partly compensated through subsidies and direct payments (Hemme 
et al. 2014). Despite these high costs, farmers and processors continue to produce and even 
export certain milk products. They do so most successfully with cheese specialties, where the 
domestic market is subject to the least protection. This positioning of Swiss products into a 
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differentiated, high-quality segment could provide Swiss producers and processors with an in-
direct form of protection that helps them avoid direct competition on the basis of costs, as it is 
the case for bulk products. 
2.5 Hypotheses 
Following the idea of the “Law of One Price” (LOP), a standard assumption is that arbitrage 
and physical trade are the drivers of market integration. Whenever prices differ between two 
separate markets, spatial arbitrage will remove this difference, at least in the long-run, allowing 
for adjustment times and accounting for trade cost (Fackler and Goodwin 2001). As Switzerland 
is a small country and in principle an open economy, we expect it to be influenced by external, 
especially neighboring European price developments if no trade restrictions are in place. This 
is the case for cheese, where trade with the EU is liberalized and markets are connected through 
large bi-directional trade flows. 
H1: In liberalized, tariff-free markets, EU and Swiss prices are highly integrated. 
Conversely, public border protection measures applied to white-line dairy products can be ex-
pected to hinder international trade and hence impede arbitrage when prices differ. The main 
border measures for dairy products are TRQs with low, binding quotas and prohibitively high 
out-of-quota tariffs (see table 1). Such clearly trade-inhibiting policies are assumed to constrain 
the pass-through of prices internationally (Conforti 2004; Bonnet et al. 2015). Fixed tariffs, as 
in place for SMP, however, should only affect the price spread between two markets, just like 
fixed transaction costs, but not the speed of price transmission (Conforti 2004). Yet, for SMP 
with an ad-valorem equivalent of 72% and very low observed import volumes (2.4% of Swiss 
production volume, see tables 1 and 2), also this measure is practically trade-inhibiting. Conse-
quently, for all dairy products, trade volumes and physical market integration are low, which 
will limit the exposure of Swiss products to price competition from imported products. 
H2: Products subject to trade-restricting policies have lower price transmission elasticities. 
Besides public policy measures, spatial arbitrage can also be inhibited by qualitative differen-
tiation of products, leading to lower international substitutability (Shaked and Sutton 1982). 
The LOP only applies to homogeneous products, which are considered perfect substitutes and 
hence share the same demand curve. If domestic products are perceived as different or superior 
to (imported) potential alternatives, this will reduce their international substitution elasticities 
and consequently the dependence on foreign price developments. If this differentiation is very 
strong, two products may be such weak substitutes that they are no longer considered to be part 
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of the same market. Consequently, there is no longer a direct price relationship through arbi-
trage and the LOP, but only an indirect link via cross-price elasticities. This may for example 
apply to Swiss specialty cheese or organic products. 
H3: The higher the qualitative differentiation, the lower the price transmission elasticity. 
To sum up, there are two product groups in the Swiss milk market: First, there are protected, 
but homogeneous bulk products such as butter and milk powder. Second, there are highly dif-
ferentiated cheese products, for which trade with the EU is fully liberalized. Following the trade 
barriers and physical market integration hypotheses (H1) and (H2), cheese products and raw 
milk intended for cheese processing should be more integrated with foreign prices than prices 
in the dairy line. Following the differentiation hypothesis (H3), the opposite would be the case. 
In the following we test whether public policy or product characteristics play the dominant role 
for spatial price transmission. 
3 Data and Methods 
Methods to study spatial price transmission and market integration have evolved over the past 
thirty years (for reviews, see e.g., Fackler and Goodwin 2001, Hassouneh et al. 2012, von 
Cramon-Taubadel 2017). We follow a widely used approach; testing for unit roots and cointe-
gration and subsequently estimating pairwise vector error correction models (VECM) or vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models in first differences. We choose this procedure for the following 
reason: We are specifically interested in the presence and strength of a long-run relationship 
(cointegrating vector) between the prices, and short-term deviations from and adjustments to it. 
Estimating and comparing these model parameters is crucial for our purpose of understanding 
price transmission in the long- and short-run for joint products under different policy regimes. 
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Table 3:  Descriptive summary statistics of monthly milk and dairy price data 
 General information 
 Summary statistics 
  Timeframe nobs Source Unit  mean sd cv 
Raw milk prices            
CH - Dairy milk 01/2000 - 05/2017 209 FOAG CHF/100kg 67.4 8.5 0.13 
CH - Cheese milk (all) 01/2000 - 05/2017 209 FOAG CHF/100kg 72.1 5.0 0.07 
CH - Cheese milk (artisan) 01/2000 - 05/2017 209 FOAG CHF/100kg 74.5 3.5 0.05 
CH - Organic milk 01/2000 - 05/2017 209 FOAG CHF/100kg 82.6 7.2 0.09 
DE - Conventional milk 01/2000 - 05/2017 209 Eurostat CHF/100kg 43.6 7.4 0.17 
DE - Organic milk 01/2007 - 05/2017 125 AMI CHF/100kg 57.8 8.5 0.15 
Wholesale prices  
  
        
CH - SMP 01/2004 - 05/2017 161 FOAG CHF/100kg 446.9 42.1 0.09 
CH - WMP 01/2004 - 05/2017 161 FOAG CHF/100kg 635.7 33.1 0.05 
CH - Butter 01/2004 - 05/2017 161 FOAG CHF/100kg 1008.0 71.8 0.07 
CH - Hard cheese 01/2000 - 05/2017 209 FCA CHF/100kg 996.2 100.5 0.10 
CH - Semi-hard cheese 01/2000 - 05/2017 209 FCA CHF/100kg 1279.0 110.9 0.09 
DE - SMP 01/2000 - 05/2017 209 Eurostat CHF/100kg 320.9 84.3 0.26 
DE - WMP 01/2000 - 05/2017 209 Eurostat CHF/100kg 380.3 80.7 0.21 
DE - Butter 01/2000 - 05/2017 209 Eurostat CHF/100kg 442.6 78.0 0.18 
DE - Emmental type 01/2000 - 05/2017 209 Eurostat CHF/100kg 595.0 119.2 0.20 
DE - Gouda type 01/2000 - 05/2017 209 Eurostat CHF/100kg 417.2 84.5 0.20 
FX - CHF/EUR exchange rate 01/2000 - 05/2017 209 SNB CHF/EUR 1.40 0.19 0.14 
CH = Switzerland; DE = Germany; AMI = Agrarmarkt Informations-Gesellschaft, FCA = Swiss Federal Customs Administra-
tion, FOAG = Swiss Federal Office for Agriculture, SNB = Swiss National Bank, sd = standard deviation, cv = coefficient of 
variation 
3.1 Data 
We use monthly Swiss average producer and wholesale prices from January 2000 to May 2017 
(see table 3). As external price reference, we choose Germany, which is a direct neighbor and 
major trading partner for dairy products (FOAG 2017). Moreover, Germany has the most cen-
tral position in the EU trade network for milk, and is hence an adequate representative of overall 
EU price developments (Benedek et al. 2017).2 
Prices are kept in original currencies (CHF and EUR) and the exchange rate is included as 
another endogenous variable in the analysis. Our study does not include transaction or transport 
costs and hence assumes them to be constant, which is frequently criticized (e.g., Abdulai 2000, 
Goodwin and Piggot 2001, Balcombe et al. 2007). Yet, in this setting we have reason to assume 
low and stable trade costs: First, the distance between Germany and Switzerland is short, and 
                                                 
2 For producer prices, the same analysis was conducted with French, Italian and EU15 reference prices. Results 
are available upon request. 
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the infrastructure is good. Second, the most-traded products cheese and milk powder are char-
acterized by high value-to-volume ratios and low perishability, both of which are associated 
with low trade costs (Hummels 1999, Limao and Venables 2001). 
As the milk price in Switzerland is made up of several components including subsidies, premi-
ums and deductions, we chose the prices in such a way as to make them as comparable as 
possible. Prices include VAT and the cheese processing payment. Any other price premiums 
(e.g., for silage-free production) and deductions are not included. The following types of raw 
milk are analyzed: 
– “Dairy milk” for production of any non-cheese products 
– “Cheese milk (all)” for cheese production by industrial or artisanal cheese dairies 
– “Cheese milk (artisanal)” for cheese production by cheese dairies classified as “artisanal” 
by the Swiss Federal Department of Economic Affairs (1999). 
– “Organic milk” for any processing channel, standards defined by Bio Suisse (2015). 
On wholesale level, for industrial dairy products, complete and consistent price data are only 
available from January 2004. The following monthly prices are analyzed: 
– Butter (industrial butter for cooking or further processing) 
– Whole milk powder (WMP), with 26% fat in dry mass, for industrial processing 
– Skimmed milk powder (SMP), with < 1.5% fat in dry mass, for industrial processing 
For cheese, average Swiss domestic prices are only available at the retail level. As retail prices 
show almost no variation and in order to stay at the level stage of the value chain, we use export 
unit values of wholesale trade. However, export unit values do not necessarily represent average 
domestic prices, but are strongly influenced by the quality of the exported products (Hallak 
2006). Therefore, we narrow down the product range to two categories: 
– Hard cheese, >45% fat in dry mass, made from silage-free raw milk 
– Semi-hard cheese, varying fat content, from raw or pasteurized milk 
In both categories, few selected Swiss specialty brands with either protected origin or a regis-
tered trademark are included to ensure comparability of the prices over time. The German ref-
erence prices are Emmental type hard cheese and Gouda type semi-hard cheese. Hard and semi-
hard cheese are chosen due to their large production and trading volumes. 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
For all analyzed milk products, Swiss prices are always higher than German prices, expect for 
milk powder during a short period in 2008 (figure 1). Besides this level difference, the volatility 
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differs as well: For butter and milk powder, Swiss prices display less variation than German 
prices. Swiss cheese prices have a larger short-term variation, which may be due to the different 
data source (export unit values instead of average wholesale prices). 
Swiss and German raw milk prices display seasonality (figure 2). The prices of Swiss raw milk 
for cheese and dairy processing follow very similar paths until 2008; then the gap widens and 
raw milk for cheese production sells for higher prices than industrial dairy milk. 
 
 
Figure 1: Monthly Swiss and German wholesale prices for dairy products and cheese 
(per kg) 
Source: Own representation based on FOAG, DG Agri, FCA 
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Figure 2:  Monthly Swiss and German raw milk producer prices (CHF/100kg) 
Source: Own representation based on FOAG, DG Agri, AMI 
3.3 Individual testing for unit roots and structural breaks 
First, we test all price series individually on their statistical properties. Both the null hypothesis 
of a unit root and the null hypothesis of stationarity are tested to better detect “near unit root 
processes” (Esposti and Listorti 2013). To account for the time-varying variance, we conduct 
the Phillips-Perron (1988) unit root test, which is robust to heteroskedasticity in the error term, 
as it uses the Newey–West (1987) heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent covari-
ance matrix estimator and corrects the error term using a Bartlett window. To detect structural 
breaks, we employ the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test of the null hypothesis of a unit root 
process with drift against the alternative of a trend stationary process that allows for a one time 
break in both the level and the trend. The break date is selected where the t-statistic from the 
ADF test of unit root is at a minimum (most negative), i.e., where the evidence is least favorable 
for the unit root null hypothesis. 
3.4 Cointegration tests 
If prices are found to be non-stationary, they are tested pairwise for cointegration, i.e., whether 
the two integrated processes share a common stochastic trend, using the Johansen (1988) coin-
tegration test. Seasonality is considered using monthly dummies and the lag-length is selected 
according to the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). As a third endogenous variable, we in-
clude the monthly average CHF/EUR exchange rate. We do not directly convert all series into 
one currency because exchange rate fluctuations may or may not be fully transmitted in the 
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given setting. Liefert and Persaud (2009) point out that tariffs prevent exchange rate transmis-
sion if they are trade-prohibiting, and TRQs do so if the quota is operative. Both is the case for 
the Swiss white-line products. 
3.5 Model specification 
The choice of the appropriate econometric specification to model the price dependencies be-
tween the two countries depends on the previously tested characteristics of the time series; re-
sulting in three cases (table 4). 
Table 4: Econometric model choice based on results from unit root and stationarity 
tests 
Time Series Model Dynamic analyzed 
I(0) VAR-Model in Levels Long-term 
I(1), r>0  Vector Error Correction Model Long-term + short-term 
I(1), r=0  VAR-Model in First Differences Short-term 
I(0)/I(1) = integrated of order 0/1, r = rank (r = 1 implies cointegration); 
Source: own representation, based on Hendry and Juselius 2001 
If the German and Swiss price of a given product are non-stationary and cointegrated, Vector 
Error Correction Models (VECM) are applied. 𝑝𝑡
𝐶𝐻 and 𝑝𝑡
𝐷𝐸 represent the respective prices for 
Switzerland and Germany in original currencies, 𝑓𝑥𝑡 the average CHF/EUR exchange rate in 
month t, all in logarithmic transformation: 











𝐶𝐻 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑝𝑡−𝑘
























Equation 1 is in first differences, capturing short-term movements, but also includes the long-
run equilibrium (cointegrating vector) between both prices, which can be re-arranged into: 
(2)   𝑝𝑡
𝐶𝐻 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑡
𝐷𝐸 +  𝛽2𝑓𝑥𝑡 
The coefficient 𝛽1 represents the long-run price transmission elasticity, i.e., how much of the 
variation in 𝑝𝑡
𝐷𝐸 is passed on to 𝑝𝑡
𝐶𝐻. Analogously, 𝛽2 captures the exchange rate pass-through, 
and 𝛽0 is a constant. This long-run equilibrium must not hold precisely at all times, but prices 
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can meander around it. How strongly and quickly 𝑝𝑡
𝐶𝐻, 𝑝𝑡
𝐷𝐸 or both return to the common equi-
librium, is determined by the error correction terms (ECT) 𝛼𝐶𝐻 and 𝛼𝐷𝐸, which ensure the 
stability of the equilibrium and describe the speed of adjustment. In theory the exchange rate 
might also adjust to restore the long-run equilibrium (i.e., 𝛼𝑓𝑥 may differ significantly from 
zero), but it is unlikely that the CHF/EUR exchange rate will respond to developments on milk 
markets. 
The δ, ρ and φ coefficients express the influence of both prices’ and the exchange rate’s past 
values on themselves and the respective other variables. Lag length 𝑘 is selected according to 
the BIC. The coefficients 𝜔 capture seasonality for the monthly seasonal dummies (𝑀1−11). 𝑋𝑡 
is a vector of exogenous variables that might affect the Swiss and the German prices. We in-
clude the following dummy variables to account for policy changes, specified as 0 before, and 
1 after the change: 
– Cheese free trade agreement with EU (07/2007) 
– Quota-abolishment in EU (04/2015) 
We do not include the end of the Swiss milk production quota (officially 05/2009) because it 
was gradually replaced by a private-law quota system (Haller 2014). Further, we do not specif-
ically model the TRQs, as the out-of-quota tariffs are prohibitively high, and hence function as 
a pure quota, with very small yearly import volumes throughout the whole time period (com-
pare tables 1 and 2). 
If German and Swiss prices are unit root processes, but not cointegrated in the long-run, a VAR-
model in first differences is used to assess short-term dependencies: 





























In this VAR in standard form, all three variables are treated as potentially endogenous and 
estimated simultaneously. The notation and included variables are the same as in the VECM 
(equation 1) above and lag length 𝑘 is again selected based on the BIC. The error terms are 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed but can be contemporaneously correlated 
with one another. The crucial difference between the VAR in differences in equation (3) and 
the VECM in equation (1) is that the former only models short-term adjustments and does not 
include a long-run cointegrating vector between the included variables. 
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4 Results 
Table 5: Results from unit root and stationarity tests 
Tested variable PP test  ZA test  KPSS test 
  H0: I(1)   H0: I(1)°   H0: I(0) 
Raw milk prices                 





CH – Cheese milk (all) -3.2  -3.3  3.4  *** 
CH – Cheese milk (artisanal) -2.7  -4.5  2.3 *** 










DE – Organic milk  -2.7   -4.89 .   0.52 ** 
Wholesale prices                













































DE – Gouda type (semi-hard cheese) -3.0   -4.26   2.26 *** 
°H0: I(1) with drift against HA: I(0) with max.1 breakpoint in intercept and/or trend 
Lags selected according to AIC (including seasonality). All prices in original currencies (DE in EUR, CH in CHF). 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
4.1 Unit root and cointegration tests 
Table 5 shows that all included price series at the producer and wholesale levels are non-sta-
tionary unit root processes. The Phillips-Perron tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root for all prices, except the Swiss cheese prices. This is because of large short-term variations 
in these export prices; if they are slightly smoothed however, the null is no longer rejected. The 
Zivot and Andrews test confirms this result by ruling out the alternative of a stationary series 
with a breakpoint on a 5% significance level. Further, the KPSS test rejects the null of station-
arity for all prices. 
Cointegration between Swiss and German prices is found for all conventional raw milk pro-
ducer prices, but at the wholesale level only for milk powder (whole and skimmed). Applying 
the Johansen trace test, no cointegration is found for organic raw milk prices, butter, hard cheese 
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and semi-hard cheese prices (table 6). Hence, we continue with VECM specifications for prod-
ucts with cointegrated prices (table 7). For the remaining products with no long-run cointegrat-
ing relationship, we continue to analyze short-term dependencies between the two countries 
through VAR-models in first differences (table 8). 






















10pct 5pct 1pct 
r <= 2 0.61 0.51 2.13 5.81 
 
1.18 0.93 1.23 0.45 0.16 
 
7.52 9.24 12.97 
r <= 1  18.43 11.94 14.35 21.37 
 
17.65 19.50 9.84 5.70 9.98 
 
17.85 19.96 24.60 
r = 0 53.73 57.02 47.74 40.74 
 
92.93 93.61 23.69 26.42 29.15 
 
32.00 34.91 41.07 
Result 
(5% sign.) 
r=1 r=1 r=1 r=0 
 
r=1 r=1 r=0 r=0 r=0 
    
* r=rank, ** tested against German organic producer price, all others against conventional producer price. Including constant in 
cointegration, all prices in logarithms, lag length acc. to BIC, seasonality considered through monthly dummies (sd1-11). 
4.2 Raw milk price results 
There is strong evidence of cointegration for all conventional raw milk price pairs. Dairy milk 
shows a higher long-run price transmission elasticity (72%) than milk for general cheese pro-
cessing (54%) and artisanal cheese processing (46%). In all cases, only Swiss prices adapt to 
this joint equilibrium at a rather low speed; for dairy milk and artisanal cheese 9% of the dise-
quilibrium is corrected within one month, for all cheese processing 11%. The exchange rate 
pass-through varies between 31% (dairy) and 39% (artisanal cheese). 
For organic raw milk, no cointegration between Swiss and German prices is detected through 
Johansen trace tests. Therefore, we apply the VAR specification to assess short-term depend-
encies between the variables. This model finds autocorrelation and seasonal patterns, and sur-
prisingly some influence of the lagged Swiss price change on the German price change 
(𝛥𝐶𝐻. 𝑙2 =  −0.15., see table 8). Yet, the statistical significance is not very strong, and the 
negative sign implies a movement in opposite directions. 
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Table 7: Selected key parameters of VECM specification for cointegrated Swiss and 
German prices with endogenous exchange rate  
Included endogenous 
variables (+ fx) 
Long Run Factors  
(Cointegrating vector beta, 
normalized to CH-price) 
 
Short Run Adjustment 
(Error correction terms) 
 
Model Fit 
















adj.R2    
CH-equ. 
adj.R2     
DE-equ. 






















dairy milk 0.72   ***  0.31  * 1.70  *** 
 




0.54 0.54 -0.01 
avg  cheese milk (all) 0.54  ***  0.34  ** 2.37  ***  -0.11  ***  0.06 .  -0.02   0.64 0.54 -0.01 
avg   
cheese milk 
(art.) 
0.46 **  0.39 * 2.58 ***   -0.09 ***  0.00   -0.00    0.36 0.51 0.00 
Processed products     
 




   
DE: 
 
CH:     
 




   
SMP 
 
SMP 0.04  *  0.27 * 1.38 **  -0.38 *** -0.13  -0.01   0.33 0.37 0.04 
WMP   WMP 0.08  **  0.08 . 1.76  ***  -0.26  *** -0.25  *  -0.06   0.37 0.48 0.05 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1, β-values stated with reverse sign 
Exog. variables: monthly dummies, policy dummies for EU-quota end and freetrade, lag selection: Schwarz criterion (k=2 for 
artisanal cheese milk, 3 for all other variables), all prices in logarithmic transformation. For the full model with all parameter 
estimates and information on model fit, see appendix (tables A1-A5). 
4.3 Wholesale price results 
Among the analyzed wholesale prices, there is evidence of cointegration for skimmed and 
whole milk powder. While this relationship is statistically significant, the long-run price trans-
mission elasticity is weak (4% and 8%), i.e., hardly any variation of or shock in the German 
price is passed on to the Swiss price. The VECM specification suggests that Swiss prices follow 
German prices, as only the Swiss price changes in response to disequilibria (𝛼𝐶𝐻 = -0.38 for 
SMP, -0.26 for WMP)3. For WMP, also 𝛼𝐷𝐸 is significant, but here the negative sign indicates 
an error-amplifying rather than an error-correcting behavior. Hence, the Swiss adjustment to-
wards, and the German movement against the join equilibrium relationship would largely can-
cel each other out, leaving little net error correction. 
                                                 
3 To ensure error-correcting behavior, negative signs are expected for 𝛼𝐶𝐻, and positive signs for 𝛼𝐷𝐸 and 𝛼𝑓𝑥 
(see VECM specified in equation (1) or Greb et al. (2013) for more details about restrictions on the 𝛼 parame-
ters). 
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Butter, as well as hard- and semi-hard cheese display no long-run price relationship between 
the two countries. The VAR-models reveal some minor short-term interactions between Swiss 
and German prices and exchange rate changes: The Swiss hard cheese price is positively influ-
enced by the previous month’s German price change (𝛥𝐷𝐸. 𝑙1 = 0.22). Yet, this effect is only 
significant at the 10% level. For semi-hard cheese, there is some influence of exchange rate 
changes on Swiss and German price changes (𝛥𝐹𝑋. 𝑙1 = 0.55∗∗∗ and 0.29∗ in the Swiss and 
German equation, respectively). German prices display a strong positive autoregressive behav-
ior for all products, whereas Swiss prices show no (butter) or even a negative influence of past 
price changes (cheese). 
Table 8: Selected key parameters of VAR(FD) specification for non-cointegrated Swiss 
and German prices with endogenous exchange rate 




























                        
Organic 0.03  0.26  -0.31 ** -0.00   0.02  0.08     0.47  *** 0.43  *** -0.06  -0.15  * 0.07  -0.09 
Processed products 







n/a  -0.07 
 
n/a   0.47 *** n/a 
 
-0.55 . n/a  0.05 
 
n/a 
Semi-hard cheese 0.09  0.04  -0.76  *** -0.46  *** 0.55  *** 0.11   0.47  *** 0.02  -0.12 . -0.15 . 0.29  * 0.07 
Hard cheese 0.22 . -0.03  -0.40  *** -0.29  *** 0.24  0.09     0.34  *** 0.08  0.02  0.04   -0.05  -0.06 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1, all variables in first differences and logarithmic transformation 
FX-equation not included here, as no effects from DE or CH prices were detected. For the full model with all parameter esti-
mates and information on model fit, see appendix (tables A6-A9). 
4.4 Robustness checks4 
Our results also hold if we control for subsidy changes. Adjusting for changes in the processing 
aid for cheese, we come up with similar results. However, as there have been compensations 
and shifts between different subsidies, especially direct payments, we chose not to model single 
subsidy changes in the main model presented here. Further, these subsidies only explain a level 
difference in prices, but not the different degrees of price transmission. 
                                                 
4 Results of alternative model specifications are available upon request. 
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For cheese and raw milk intended for cheese processing, we also estimated price transmission 
separately for the subsamples before and after trade liberalization in July 2007. Results show 
that the long-run price transmission elasticity and the speed of adjustment increased after the 
trade liberalization. However, we cannot clearly attribute this to the policy change because the 
global price spikes in 2008 and subsequently increased overall volatility occurred chronologi-
cally soon after the policy change. 
Converting all prices into one currency and excluding the exchange rate leads to the same con-
clusions regarding cointegration and the dependency on German prices, but increases the esti-
mates of the price transmission elasticities. In models with two endogenous variables only, it is 
possible to test for threshold effects, as done in many recent price transmission studies (e.g., 
Djuric et al. 2015, Hu and Brorsen 2017). In this two-variable specification, we test for thresh-
old cointegration and estimate (Momentum) Threshold Autoregression models (TAR/MTAR). 
However, we find only weak evidence for threshold effects, depending on the exact model 
specification and the type of threshold tests applied. Furthermore, eliminating the exchange rate 
from the estimation model is equivalent to assuming 100% exchange rate pass-through, which 
is clearly rejected by our data (see above). Hence, we decided not to pursue the threshold model 
further. 
5 Discussion 
Our results show that German prices influence Swiss prices for raw milk producer prices more 
than for processed products’ wholesale prices. On both levels, this price pass-through from 
Germany to Switzerland is higher in the tariff-protected industrial dairy processing channel 
than for liberalized cheese products. We interpret this as evidence that qualitative product dif-
ferentiation contributes more than public border protection to segment the Swiss market from 
the surrounding EU market. 
5.1 The role of border protection 
We find that in the analyzed case, public border protection and trade policies are not the decisive 
factor. Cheese trade between Switzerland and the EU is liberalized, but we find that Swiss 
prices for hard- and semi-hard cheese are nevertheless independent of German price develop-
ments and exchange rate changes. However, some long-run spatial price transmission is de-
tected for skimmed and whole milk powder. Given that the protected dairy products are more 
homogeneous than cheese, this cannot be directly compared. Further, we have no counterfactual 
for the same products without the tariffs or TRQs, so no precise effect can be attributed to these 
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policies. Public policies probably help to prevent more complete price transmission on the 
wholesale level and to maintain the level gap between domestic and foreign prices. 
On producer price level, however, trade measures seem to lose their protective function. Prices 
for raw milk processed into protected dairy products are more strongly influenced by German 
price developments than raw milk for cheese production. A level difference between these two 
types of raw milk can partly be explained through targeted subsidies (Finger et al. 2017), but 
not the fact that farmers supplying milk to the dairy processing channels are more exposed to 
foreign price shocks than farmers supplying cheese dairies. 
We also find that trade volumes only play a minor role in explaining price transmission. There 
are high long-run price transmission elasticities (46-72%) in non-traded raw milk, but only low, 
if any, price transmission (elasticity <10%) for traded products at the wholesale level. This is 
rather surprising and may support the hypothesis that not only physical trade flows, but also 
information flows matter for market integration (Stephens et al. 2012). Since information on 
foreign dairy markets is available to and analyzed both by public and private Swiss actors, we 
can assume that information does flow and is reacted upon at all times. Hence, processors and 
traders observe surrounding EU markets and pass on these signals to their Swiss suppliers, even 
though they do not compete directly, and do not adjust wholesale prices on the domestic mar-
kets for protected dairy products. 
This mechanism may be supported by the private Swiss national milk market organization, IP 
Lait, which publishes monthly indicative prices for different milk segments (IP Lait 2017). It 
is not fully transparent how these indicative prices are set, but they very likely also consider 
world market and European price developments (for details, see FOAG 2017). These prices are 
non-binding, and effectively paid prices do not follow them strictly (FOAG 2017). Yet, all 
major processors are members of this organization and in both public debates about “fair” milk 
prices and sector-internal benchmarkings these indicative prices are frequently taken as refer-
ence points, making them a relevant price signal (e.g., PSL 2018). 
Alternatively, one may also interpret this passing on of price signals to producers as indirect 
arbitrage, as processors do compete with EU products when exporting goods such as milk pow-
der to world markets. Even through Germany and Switzerland barely trade fluid milk or milk 
powder between one another, they do both export milk powder to third countries, where they 
compete with one another. 
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5.2 The role of qualitative product characteristics 
Our results suggest that qualitative differentiation limits spatial price transmission between 
Switzerland and Germany. This differentiation can refer to raw milk (e.g., organic production, 
silage-free feeding) or the actual product processing (artisanal production, specialty brands). It 
seems that both types of differentiation are closely linked, i.e., high-quality raw milk is pro-
cessed into highly differentiated end-products, and it is not possible to disentangle which con-
tributes more to reduce substitutability and to stabilize prices. On the producer level, prices of 
differentiated raw milk are linked less strongly to European price developments than raw milk 
intended for industrial dairy products. This also holds when controlling for subsidies, e.g., for 
processing into cheese, silage-free feeding, or organic production. 
Hence, long-run price transmission elasticities and short-run adjustments between German and 
Swiss milk markets appear to be determined not primarily by the type or degree of public border 
protection or the physical trade volume, but rather by product characteristics that reduce the 
international substitutability, such as specialty cheese and organic products. 
5.3 Limitations 
Our results should be interpreted with caution, as our contribution is only a partial assessment 
of complex price setting processes. We analyze aggregated price data and do not account for 
structural market differences between and within the analyzed countries. Particularly, we do 
not consider the role of value chain characteristics, such as contracts, governance structures, 
and market concentration. Yet, these factors certainly affect market prices and ultimately price 
transmission estimates. While our discussion stresses the aspects of border protection and qual-
itative differentiation, these are not the only explanations for the observed price transmission 
behavior. 
6 Conclusion 
If the aim is to protect raw milk prices against foreign price shocks and to stabilize producer 
prices, we show that quality differentiation may be an alternative to public trade restrictions. 
This alternative positioning via high quality can support domestic production without govern-
ment intervention and without generating the deadweight welfare losses that are associated with 
tariffs. Hence, producers and processors themselves can take action and implement strategies 
to compete via quality characteristics rather than the price. Yet, as it takes bundled efforts along 
the value chain, governmental bodies could help to position Swiss products accordingly. Pro-
moting Swissness as a brand could help the products to gain visibility, to be perceived as high-
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quality, and to ultimately stay competitive in domestic and international markets. First steps 
have been taken with the implementation of Swissness legislation, which stipulates that prod-
ucts labeled as Swiss must contain a significant share of Swiss raw ingredients (as much as 
100% for milk products). Our study provides evidence that a policy focus on such a quality 
strategy, i.e., promoting less easily substitutable domestic products, may be more effective than 
protectionism via tariff barriers. An integrated value chain approach, coordinating differentia-
tion efforts across milk production, processing and retail stage could ensure that farmers, pro-
ducers and consumers benefit alike. This quality can take various forms: organic, animal-
friendly, ecological, regional, or traditional, depending on consumption trends. In the end, the 
consumer has to perceive it as a superior product, resulting in a higher willingness to pay and 
lower substitution elasticities with foreign products. Since quality is partly a credence attribute, 
communication and information must be trusted by the consumers. 
We conclude that such a positioning is especially appropriate for Switzerland. First, as a small 
country with large close-by export markets, oversupply should not be a major issue. Second, as 
a high-income country, there is a large domestic demand for high-quality products. Finally, as 
high-cost country, there is a certain necessity to compete via quality, not via the price. 
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Appendix (Full Model Specifications) 
a) Vector Error Correction Models for cointegrated prices 
Table A1 (Dairy milk): VECM with Swiss producer prices for dairy processing, German 
conventional producer price and exchange rate 
 
Response CH Price Response DE Price Response Exchange Rate: 
  Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   
ect1 -0.088 0.019 0.000 *** 0.054 0.028 0.056 . -0.010 0.016 0.518 
 
Quota.EU 0.005 0.004 0.266 
 
-0.003 0.006 0.569 
 
0.005 0.003 0.127 
 
Freetrade -0.017 0.004 0.000 *** 0.012 0.005 0.035 * -0.006 0.003 0.053 . 
sd1 -0.002 0.007 0.747 
 
0.003 0.010 0.780 
 
-0.007 0.005 0.230 
 
sd2 0.000 0.007 0.990 
 
0.032 0.010 0.002 ** -0.002 0.006 0.753 
 
sd3 -0.008 0.007 0.230 
 
0.034 0.010 0.001 *** -0.003 0.006 0.590 
 
sd4 -0.008 0.007 0.219 
 
0.029 0.010 0.004 ** 0.000 0.006 0.972 
 
sd5 -0.002 0.007 0.790 
 
0.027 0.010 0.007 ** -0.003 0.006 0.561 
 
sd6 0.047 0.007 0.000 *** 0.040 0.010 0.000 *** -0.007 0.006 0.229 
 
sd7 0.035 0.008 0.000 *** 0.040 0.012 0.001 *** 0.000 0.007 0.984 
 
sd8 0.031 0.008 0.000 *** 0.045 0.012 0.000 *** -0.002 0.007 0.821 
 
sd9 0.025 0.008 0.001 ** 0.052 0.011 0.000 *** 0.009 0.006 0.157 
 
sd10 0.014 0.007 0.045 * 0.051 0.010 0.000 *** 0.004 0.006 0.502 
 
sd11 -0.014 0.006 0.034 * 0.026 0.009 0.005 ** 0.001 0.005 0.852 
 
CH_prod.dai
ry.dl1 -0.108 0.077 0.165 
 
0.244 0.112 0.031 * -0.020 0.064 0.751 
 
DE_prod.dl1 0.151 0.054 0.006 ** 0.297 0.079 0.000 *** 0.001 0.045 0.985 
 
fx.dl1 0.250 0.089 0.006 ** 0.062 0.130 0.633 
 
0.098 0.074 0.188 
 
CH_prod.dai
ry.dl2 -0.194 0.080 0.016 * 0.032 0.116 0.784 
 
-0.042 0.067 0.533 
 
DE_prod.dl2 0.163 0.055 0.004 ** 0.199 0.080 0.014 * -0.016 0.046 0.728 
 
fx.dl2 0.118 0.091 0.197 
 
-0.062 0.133 0.642 
 
-0.045 0.076 0.550 
 
CH_prod.dai
ry.dl3 -0.072 0.078 0.359 
 
0.045 0.113 0.691 
 
-0.110 0.065 0.092 . 
DE_prod.dl3 0.044 0.052 0.399 
 
0.008 0.076 0.914 
 
0.034 0.043 0.437 
 
fx.dl3 0.171 0.090 0.060 . -0.037 0.132 0.777  0.099 0.075 0.189  
                          
Resid. st. er-
ror 
0.017 on 180 DF  0.025 on 180 DF  0.014 on 180 DF 
 
Mult. R-squ 0.598  0.593  0.112 
 
Adj. R-squ 0.544  0.539  -0.006 
 
F-stat 11.15 on 24 and 180 DF  10.94 on 24 and 180 DF  0.949 on 24 and 180 DF 
 
p-value < 2.2e-16   < 2.2e-16   0.536 
 
Beta (coint. vector):  1 CH_prod.dairy – 0.72 DE_prod – 0.31 fx – 1.70  
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1, all variables in logarithmic transformation 
DF = degrees of freedom, dl = differenced, lagged, ect = error correction term (alpha), Freetrade = cheese-free-trade-dummy: 
0 before, 1 after 07/2007, Quota.EU = end-of-EU-quota dummy: 0 before, 1 after 04/2015, sd = seasonal dummy 
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Table A2 (Cheese milk): VECM with Swiss producer prices for cheese processing (all), 
German conventional producer price and exchange rate 
 
Response CH Price Response DE Price Response Exchange Rate 
  Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   
ect1 -0.111 0.018 0.000 *** 0.055 0.040 0.171 
 
-0.021 0.023 0.373 
 
Quota.EU 0.009 0.003 0.004 ** -0.006 0.007 0.346 
 
0.006 0.004 0.105 
 
Freetrade -0.008 0.002 0.000 *** 0.005 0.004 0.144 
 
-0.005 0.002 0.012 * 
sd1 -0.003 0.004 0.513 
 
0.006 0.010 0.559 
 
-0.005 0.006 0.364 
 
sd2 -0.009 0.004 0.040 * 0.039 0.010 0.000 *** 0.000 0.006 0.976 
 
sd3 -0.013 0.005 0.005 ** 0.036 0.010 0.000 *** -0.004 0.006 0.458 
 
sd4 -0.007 0.004 0.111 
 
0.028 0.010 0.004 ** -0.002 0.006 0.730 
 
sd5 -0.001 0.004 0.751 
 
0.026 0.010 0.008 ** -0.002 0.006 0.697 
 
sd6 0.030 0.004 0.000 *** 0.043 0.010 0.000 *** -0.005 0.006 0.353 
 
sd7 0.034 0.005 0.000 *** 0.053 0.012 0.000 *** 0.003 0.007 0.652 
 
sd8 0.035 0.005 0.000 *** 0.057 0.012 0.000 *** 0.000 0.007 0.992 
 
sd9 0.028 0.005 0.000 *** 0.060 0.011 0.000 *** 0.007 0.007 0.313 
 
sd10 0.017 0.005 0.001 *** 0.059 0.011 0.000 *** 0.004 0.006 0.515 
 
sd11 -0.010 0.004 0.028 * 0.030 0.010 0.002 ** 0.001 0.006 0.834 
 
CH_prod.che
ese.dl1 -0.359 0.074 0.000 *** 0.058 0.164 0.724 
 
-0.080 0.094 0.398 
 
DE_prod.dl1 0.073 0.033 0.028 * 0.361 0.073 0.000 *** 0.004 0.042 0.925 
 
fx.dl1 0.134 0.058 0.022 * 0.098 0.128 0.443 
 
0.098 0.074 0.183 
 
CH_prod.che
ese.dl2 -0.180 0.076 0.018 * -0.135 0.166 0.419 
 
-0.048 0.096 0.618 
 
DE_prod.dl2 0.089 0.033 0.008 ** 0.255 0.073 0.001 *** -0.027 0.042 0.518 
 
fx.dl2 0.059 0.059 0.320 
 
-0.007 0.129 0.959 
 
-0.037 0.074 0.623 
 
                          
Resid. st. er-
ror 0.011 on 184 DF 
 
0.025 on 184 DF 
 
0.014 on 184 DF 
 












F-stat 18.4 on 21 and 184 DF 
 
12.5 on 21 and 184 DF 
 
0.927 on 21 and 184 DF 
 
p-value < 2.2e-16   < 2.2e-16   0.556 
 
Beta (coint. vector):  1 CH_prod.cheese – 0.54 DE_prod – 0.34 fx – 2.37  
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1, all variables in logarithmic transformation 
DF = degrees of freedom, dl = differenced, lagged, ect = error correction term (alpha), Freetrade = cheese-free-trade-





Table A3 (Artisanal cheese milk): VECM with Swiss producer prices for artisanal 
cheese processing, German convent. producer price and exchange rate 
 
Response CH Price Response DE Price Response Exchange Rate 




)   Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   
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ect1 -0.092 0.016 0.000 *** 0.004 0.040 0.922 
 
-0.003 0.022 0.884 
 
Quota.EU 0.010 0.003 0.001 ** -0.001 0.007 0.857 
 
0.005 0.004 0.246 
 
Freetrade -0.001 0.001 0.569 
 
0.003 0.003 0.290 
 
-0.004 0.002 0.015 * 
sd1 -0.007 0.004 0.081 . 0.007 0.009 0.451 
 
-0.006 0.005 0.270 
 
sd2 -0.005 0.004 0.202 
 
0.028 0.009 0.004 ** 0.001 0.005 0.832 
 
sd3 -0.007 0.004 0.070 . 0.022 0.009 0.014 * -0.002 0.005 0.688 
 
sd4 -0.006 0.004 0.119 
 
0.019 0.009 0.037 * 0.000 0.005 0.938 
 
sd5 0.001 0.004 0.736 
 
0.018 0.009 0.047 * 0.000 0.005 0.923 
 
sd6 0.008 0.004 0.030 * 0.032 0.009 0.001 *** -0.004 0.005 0.384 
 
sd7 0.013 0.004 0.001 *** 0.041 0.009 0.000 *** 0.001 0.005 0.784 
 
sd8 0.011 0.004 0.006 ** 0.042 0.009 0.000 *** -0.003 0.005 0.619 
 
sd9 0.016 0.004 0.000 *** 0.052 0.009 0.000 *** 0.004 0.005 0.477 
 
sd10 0.010 0.004 0.010 ** 0.051 0.009 0.000 *** 0.001 0.005 0.809 
 
sd11 -0.001 0.004 0.731 
 
0.026 0.009 0.005 ** -0.001 0.005 0.860 
 
CH_prod.art.che
es.dl1 -0.136 0.072 0.061 . 0.083 0.176 0.637 
 
0.055 0.098 0.577 
 
DE_prod.dl1 0.033 0.027 0.226 
 
0.472 0.065 0.000 *** -0.024 0.037 0.520 
 
fx.dl1 0.082 0.054 0.130 
 
0.087 0.130 0.504 
 
0.098 0.073 0.181 
 
                          
Resid. st. error 0.011 on 188 DF  0.026 on 188 DF  0.014 on 188 DF 
 
Mult. R-squ 0.416  0.557  0.089 
 
Adj. R-squ 0.360  0.514  0.002 
 
F-stat 7.434 on 18 and 188 DF  13.12 on 18 and 188 DF  1.02 on 18 and 188 DF 
 
p-value 2.53E-11   < 2.2e-16   0.440 
 
Beta (coint. vector):  1 CH_prod.art.cheese – 0.46 DE_prod – 0.39 fx – 2.58 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1, all variables in logarithmic transformation 
DF = degrees of freedom, dl = differenced, lagged, ect= error correction term (alpha), Freetrade = cheese-free-trade-
dummy: 0 before, 1 after 07/2007, Quota.EU = end-of-EU-quota dummy: 0 before, 1 after 04/2015, sd = seasonal dummy 
 
 
Table A4 (Skimmed Milk Powder): VECM with Swiss and German SMP wholesale 
price and exchange rate 
 
Response CH Price Response DE Price Response Exchange Rate 
  Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   
ect1 -0.384 0.045 0.000 *** -0.128 0.092 0.167 
 
-0.013 0.033 0.702 
 
Quota.EU -0.003 0.005 0.531 
 
-0.004 0.010 0.705 
 
0.005 0.004 0.148 
 
Freetrade -0.012 0.003 0.000 *** -0.003 0.005 0.628 
 
-0.005 0.002 0.011 * 
sd1 -0.006 0.008 0.493 
 
-0.023 0.018 0.186 
 
-0.011 0.006 0.079 . 
sd2 -0.015 0.008 0.073 . -0.006 0.017 0.737 
 
-0.002 0.006 0.779 
 
sd3 -0.014 0.009 0.092 . -0.030 0.018 0.089 . -0.006 0.006 0.315 
 
sd4 -0.009 0.008 0.283 
 
-0.001 0.017 0.930 
 
-0.002 0.006 0.719 
 
sd5 -0.018 0.008 0.036 * -0.008 0.017 0.631 
 
-0.004 0.006 0.556 
 
sd6 -0.014 0.008 0.100 
 
-0.009 0.017 0.626 
 
-0.011 0.006 0.078 . 
sd7 -0.006 0.008 0.479 
 
-0.017 0.017 0.332 
 
0.000 0.006 0.995 
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sd8 -0.020 0.008 0.018 * -0.017 0.017 0.331 
 
-0.006 0.006 0.340 
 
sd9 -0.010 0.008 0.255 
 
-0.007 0.017 0.671 
 
0.002 0.006 0.703 
 
sd10 -0.013 0.008 0.122 
 
-0.026 0.017 0.139 
 
0.000 0.006 0.962 
 
sd11 -0.006 0.008 0.497 
 
-0.045 0.017 0.010 * -0.006 0.006 0.367 
 
SMP_CH.dl1 -0.544 0.087 0.000 *** -0.299 0.181 0.102 
 
-0.085 0.064 0.188 
 
SMP_DE.dl1 -0.067 0.039 0.094 . 0.734 0.082 0.000 *** 0.059 0.029 0.044 * 
fx.dl1 0.084 0.117 0.477 
 
0.221 0.243 0.366 
 
0.138 0.086 0.113 
 
SMP_CH.dl2 -0.428 0.090 0.000 *** -0.144 0.186 0.442 
 
-0.026 0.066 0.696 
 
SMP_DE.dl2 -0.046 0.041 0.268 
 
-0.362 0.086 0.000 *** -0.030 0.030 0.330 
 
fx.dl2 -0.037 0.114 0.746 
 
0.238 0.236 0.315 
 
-0.089 0.084 0.289 
 
                          
Resid. st. error 0.021 on 136 DF  0.043 on 136 DF  0.015 on 136 DF 
 
Mult. R-squ 0.426  0.457  0.172 
 
Adj. R-squ 0.331  0.373  0.044 
 
F-stat 4.81 on 21 and 136 DF  5.448 on 21 and 136 DF  1.344 on 21 and 136 DF 
 
p-value 6.72E-09   2.988E-10   0.159 
 
Beta (coint. vector):  1 SMP_CH – 0.04 SMP_DE – 0.27 fx – 1.38  
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1, all variables in logarithmic transformation 
DF = degrees of freedom, dl = differenced, lagged, ect= error correction term (alpha), Freetrade = cheese-free-trade-
dummy: 0 before, 1 after 07/2007, Quota.EU = end-of-EU-quota dummy: 0 before, 1 after 04/2015, sd = seasonal dummy 
 
 
Table A5 (Whole Milk Powder): VECM with Swiss and German WMP wholesale price 
and exchange rate 
 
Response CH Price Response DE Price Response Exchange Rate 
  Estimate 
Std.Er-
ror Pr(>|t|)   
Esti-
mate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   Estimate 
Std.Er-
ror Pr(>|t|)   
ect1 -0.262 0.030 0.000 *** -0.245 0.103 0.018 * -0.057 0.043 0.191 
 
Quota.EU -0.005 0.003 0.061 . -0.003 0.009 0.734 
 
0.004 0.004 0.266 
 
Freetrade -0.010 0.002 0.000 *** -0.008 0.005 0.147 
 
-0.007 0.002 0.003 ** 
sd1 -0.015 0.004 0.001 *** -0.011 0.015 0.450 
 
-0.010 0.006 0.115 
 
sd2 -0.008 0.004 0.076 . -0.011 0.015 0.464 
 
-0.002 0.006 0.697 
 
sd3 -0.010 0.004 0.027 * -0.026 0.015 0.079 . -0.007 0.006 0.293 
 
sd4 -0.008 0.004 0.053 . 0.009 0.014 0.531 
 
-0.001 0.006 0.839 
 
sd5 -0.010 0.004 0.019 * -0.017 0.015 0.250 
 
-0.004 0.006 0.515 
 
sd6 -0.006 0.004 0.142 
 
0.000 0.014 0.980 
 
-0.010 0.006 0.102 
 
sd7 -0.010 0.004 0.020 * -0.014 0.014 0.328 
 
0.000 0.006 0.946 
 
sd8 -0.007 0.004 0.098 . -0.022 0.015 0.143 
 
-0.006 0.006 0.339 
 
sd9 -0.007 0.004 0.112 
 
0.007 0.014 0.615 
 
0.003 0.006 0.563 
 
sd10 -0.007 0.004 0.130 
 
-0.008 0.015 0.583 
 
0.000 0.006 0.944 
 
sd11 -0.004 0.004 0.343 
 
-0.032 0.014 0.031 * -0.006 0.006 0.358 
 
WMP_CH.dl1 -0.468 0.086 0.000 *** -0.805 0.289 0.006 ** -0.210 0.122 0.086 . 
WMP_DE.dl1 -0.023 0.024 0.328 
 
0.821 0.079       0.000  *** 0.060 0.033 0.073 . 
fx.dl1 0.024 0.060 0.688 
 
-0.112 0.202 0.582 
 
0.138 0.085 0.108 
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WMP_CH.dl2 -0.369 0.087 0.000 *** -0.822 0.294 0.006 ** -0.225 0.124 0.072 . 
WMP_DE.dl2 0.005 0.024 0.835 
 
-0.329 0.082 0.000 *** -0.052 0.035 0.133 
 
fx.dl2 -0.023 0.059 0.697 
 
0.438 0.200 0.030 * -0.056 0.084 0.506 
 
                          
Resid. st. error 0.011 on 136 DF  0.036 on 136 DF  0.015 on 136 DF 
 
Mult. R-squ 0.456  0.553  0.181 
 
Adj. R-squ 0.373  0.484  0.054 
 
F-stat 5.438 on 21 and 136 DF  8.016 on 21 and 136 DF  1.434 on 21 and 136 DF 
 
p-value 3.14E-10   3.01E-12   0.113 
 
Beta (coint. vector):  1 WMP_CH – 0.08 WMP_DE – 0.08 fx – 1.76  
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1, all variables in logarithmic transformation 
DF = degrees of freedom, dl = differenced, lagged, ect= error correction term (alpha), Freetrade = cheese-free-trade-




b) Vector Autoregressive models in first differences for non-cointegrated prices 
 
Table A6 (Organic raw milk): VAR in first differences with Swiss and German organic 
milk producer price and exchange rate 
 
CH Equation DE Equation Exchange Rate Equation 
  Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   Estimate 
Std.Er-
ror Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   
DE.l1 0.027 0.149 0.856 
 
0.472 0.100 0.000 *** -0.066 0.163 0.687 
 
CH.l1 -0.309 0.099 0.002 ** -0.060 0.066 0.368 
 
-0.010 0.108 0.930 
 
FX.l1 0.015 0.092 0.871 
 
0.067 0.062 0.277 
 
0.113 0.100 0.262 
 
DE.l2 0.256 0.158 0.107 
 
0.432 0.105 0.000 *** 0.073 0.172 0.671 
 
CH.l2 -0.003 0.101 0.973 
 
-0.148 0.067 0.031 * -0.127 0.110 0.249 
 
FX.l2 0.081 0.093 0.384 
 
-0.087 0.062 0.164 
 
-0.088 0.101 0.389 
 
DE.l3 0.231 0.157 0.146 
 
-0.011 0.105 0.918 
 
0.033 0.171 0.846 
 
CH.l3 -0.074 0.097 0.452 
 
-0.113 0.065 0.085 . -0.100 0.106 0.347 
 
FX.l3 0.055 0.092 0.552 
 
0.081 0.061 0.187 
 
0.084 0.100 0.402 
 
const -0.001 0.002 0.706 
 
0.000 0.001 0.728 
 
-0.004 0.002 0.027 * 
sd1 -0.004 0.008 0.580 
 
0.021 0.005 0.000 *** 0.016 0.008 0.053 . 
sd2 0.004 0.009 0.649 
 
0.013 0.006 0.026 * 0.014 0.009 0.126 
 
sd3 0.018 0.008 0.034 * 0.008 0.005 0.167 
 
0.017 0.009 0.066 . 
sd4 0.018 0.008 0.017 * 0.012 0.005 0.023 * 0.017 0.008 0.047 * 
sd5 0.076 0.008 0.000 *** 0.019 0.005 0.001 *** 0.010 0.009 0.255 
 
sd6 0.095 0.011 0.000 *** 0.026 0.007 0.001 *** 0.021 0.012 0.082 . 
sd7 0.051 0.014 0.001 *** 0.029 0.010 0.003 ** 0.022 0.016 0.173 
 
sd8 0.040 0.015 0.009 ** 0.037 0.010 0.000 *** 0.039 0.016 0.019 * 
sd9 0.003 0.013 0.794 
 
0.034 0.008 0.000 *** 0.029 0.014 0.036 * 
sd10 -0.004 0.010 0.700  0.017 0.007 0.014 * 0.019 0.011 0.076 . 
sd11 0.007 0.009 0.408  0.002 0.006 0.766  0.014 0.009 0.135  
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EU-quota 0.001 0.004 0.833 
 
0.000 0.003 0.944 
 
0.006 0.004 0.158 
 
                          
Resid. st. error 0.016 on 98 DF 
 
0.011 on 98 DF 
 
0.018 on 98 DF 
 












F-stat 15.47 on 21 and 98 DF 
 
10.03 on 21 and 98 DF 
 
0.769 on 21 and 98 DF 
 
p-value <2.2e-16   2.98E-13   0.749 
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1, all variables in first differences and logarithmic transfor-
mation 




Table A7 (Butter): VAR in first differences with Swiss and German wholesale butter 
price and exchange rate 
 
CH Equation DE Equation Exchange Rate Equation 
  Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   Estimate 
Std.Er-
ror Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   
DE.l1 0.017 0.020 0.390 
 
0.471 0.077 0.000 *** -0.001 0.025 0.978 
 
CH.l1 -0.019 0.086 0.822 
 
-0.550 0.331 0.099 . 0.066 0.107 0.535 
 
FX.l1 -0.066 0.068 0.336 
 
0.052 0.262 0.842 
 
0.096 0.084 0.260 
 
const 0.001 0.002 0.552 
 
0.000 0.009 0.989 
 
0.001 0.003 0.628 
 
sd1 -0.001 0.005 0.791 
 
0.009 0.019 0.652 
 
0.009 0.006 0.166 
 
sd2 -0.007 0.005 0.159 
 
0.006 0.019 0.746 
 
0.007 0.006 0.268 
 
sd3 -0.006 0.005 0.252 
 
0.002 0.019 0.908 
 
0.009 0.006 0.134 
 
sd4 -0.003 0.005 0.484 
 
0.035 0.019 0.068 . 0.008 0.006 0.182 
 
sd5 -0.005 0.005 0.343 
 
0.029 0.019 0.130 
 
0.001 0.006 0.816 
 
sd6 0.000 0.005 0.981 
 
0.009 0.020 0.640 
 
0.012 0.006 0.061 . 
sd7 -0.002 0.005 0.668 
 
0.007 0.019 0.713 
 
0.005 0.006 0.391 
 
sd8 -0.006 0.005 0.216 
 
0.027 0.019 0.164 
 
0.014 0.006 0.029 * 
sd9 -0.001 0.005 0.909 
 
-0.007 0.019 0.715 
 
0.012 0.006 0.058 . 
sd10 -0.003 0.005 0.521 
 
-0.007 0.019 0.722 
 
0.005 0.006 0.424 
 
sd11 -0.003 0.005 0.489 
 
-0.008 0.019 0.676 
 
0.009 0.006 0.160 
 
Quota.EU -0.001 0.004 0.856 
 
-0.005 0.016 0.767 
 
0.005 0.005 0.322 
 
Freetrade 0.002 0.005 0.639 
 
-0.016 0.017 0.355 
 
-0.005 0.006 0.390 
 
                          
Resid. st. error 0.013 on 139 DF 
 
0.048 on 139 DF 
 
0.048 on 139 DF 
 












F-stat 0.812 on 18 and 139 DF 
 
3.993 on 18 and 139 DF 
 
3.993 on 18 and 139 DF 
 
p-value 0.683   1.35E-06   1.35E-06 
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1, all variables in first differences and logarithmic transfoe-
mation 
DF = degrees of freedom, l =lagged, Freetrade = cheese-free-trade-dummy: 0 before, 1 after 07/2007, Quota.EU = end-
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Table A8 (Semi-hard cheese): VAR in first differences with Swiss semi-hard cheese and 
German Gouda-type wholesale price and exchange rate 
 
CH Equation DE Equation Exchange Rate Equation 
  Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   
DE.l1 0.088 0.078 0.261 
 
0.473 0.073 0.000 *** -0.010 0.038 0.793 
 
CH.l1 -0.763 0.073 0.000 *** -0.122 0.068 0.074 . -0.036 0.035 0.306 
 
FX.l1 0.552 0.154 0.000 *** 0.293 0.143 0.042 * 0.131 0.074 0.079 . 
DE.l2 0.038 0.087 0.666 
 
0.022 0.081 0.786 
 
0.040 0.042 0.338 
 
CH.l2 -0.463 0.086 0.000 *** -0.153 0.080 0.057 . 0.018 0.041 0.656 
 
FX.l2 0.113 0.158 0.476 
 
0.071 0.147 0.629 
 
-0.073 0.076 0.341 
 
DE.l3 0.036 0.077 0.642 
 
-0.075 0.072 0.301 
 
-0.072 0.037 0.054 . 
CH.l3 -0.292 0.074 0.000 *** -0.213 0.069 0.002 ** -0.030 0.036 0.407 
 
FX.l3 0.296 0.157 0.062 . -0.024 0.146 0.869 
 
0.044 0.076 0.560 
 
const 0.000 0.005 0.958 
 
0.004 0.005 0.447 
 
0.000 0.003 0.854 
 
sd1 -0.001 0.011 0.941 
 
-0.003 0.010 0.800 
 
0.006 0.005 0.224 
 
sd2 0.008 0.011 0.471  -0.005 0.011 0.668  0.004 0.005 0.479  
sd3 0.008 0.011 0.480  -0.011 0.010 0.300  0.006 0.005 0.223  
sd4 0.018 0.010 0.088 . 0.003 0.010 0.749  0.003 0.005 0.528  
sd5 0.019 0.010 0.064 . 0.007 0.010 0.485  0.001 0.005 0.799  
sd6 0.010 0.010 0.319  0.021 0.010 0.030 * 0.006 0.005 0.246  
sd7 0.005 0.010 0.609  0.000 0.010 0.981  0.002 0.005 0.670  
sd8 0.034 0.011 0.002 ** 0.003 0.010 0.768 
 
0.008 0.005 0.114 
 
sd9 0.034 0.010 0.001 ** 0.010 0.010 0.329 
 
0.008 0.005 0.130 
 
sd10 0.056 0.010 0.000 *** 0.005 0.009 0.581 
 
0.004 0.005 0.426 
 
sd11 0.045 0.010 0.000 *** 0.016 0.010 0.094 . 0.006 0.005 0.224 
 
Quota.EU -0.003 0.008 0.735 
 
0.004 0.008 0.655 
 
0.006 0.004 0.175 
 
Freetrade -0.002 0.010 0.821 
 
0.011 0.009 0.251 
 
-0.005 0.005 0.273 
 
                          
Resid. st. 
error 0.029 on 179 DF 
 
0.027 on 179 DF 
 















F-stat 6.88 on 24 and 179 DF 
 
4.535 on 24 and 179 DF 
 
1.097 on 24 and 179 DF 
 
p-value 2.11E-12   1.445E-09   0.351 
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1, all variables in first differences and logarithmic transformation 
DF = degrees of freedom, l =lagged, Freetrade = cheese-free-trade-dummy: 0 before, 1 after 07/2007, Quota.EU = end-of-
EU-quota dummy: 0 before, 1 after 04/2015, sd = seasonal dummy 
 
 
Table A9 (Hard cheese): VAR in first differences with Swiss hard cheese and German 
Emmental-type wholesale price and exchange rate 
 
CH Equation DE Equation Exchange Rate Equation 
  Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   Estimate 
Std.Er-
ror Pr(>|t|)   Estimate Std.Error Pr(>|t|)   
DE.l1 0.221 0.115 0.057 . 0.343 0.074 0.000 *** -0.014 0.057 0.057 . 
CH.l1 -0.397 0.072 0.000 *** 0.016 0.047 0.734  -0.038 0.036 0.000 *** 
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FX.l1 0.238 0.150 0.114  -0.047 0.097 0.625  0.107 0.075 0.114  
DE.l2 -0.025 0.116 0.830  0.078 0.075 0.302  0.024 0.058 0.830  
CH.l2 -0.294 0.071 0.000 *** 0.036 0.046 0.436  -0.056 0.035 0.000 *** 
FX.l2 0.089 0.151 0.557  -0.057 0.097 0.561  -0.032 0.075 0.557  
const -0.003 0.005 0.585  0.001 0.003 0.760  -0.001 0.003 0.585  
sd1 0.006 0.010 0.538  0.016 0.007 0.015 * 0.006 0.005 0.538  
sd2 0.011 0.010 0.280  0.011 0.006 0.088 . 0.004 0.005 0.280  
sd3 -0.002 0.010 0.814  0.013 0.006 0.048 * 0.006 0.005 0.814  
sd4 0.003 0.010 0.768  0.011 0.006 0.094 . 0.005 0.005 0.768  
sd5 0.003 0.010 0.730  0.007 0.006 0.304  0.001 0.005 0.730  
sd6 0.029 0.010 0.004 ** 0.018 0.006 0.006 ** 0.007 0.005 0.004 ** 
sd7 0.018 0.010 0.071 . 0.015 0.007 0.026 * 0.004 0.005 0.071 . 
sd8 0.028 0.010 0.005 ** 0.017 0.006 0.011 * 0.010 0.005 0.005 ** 
sd9 0.049 0.010 0.000 *** 0.021 0.006 0.002 ** 0.007 0.005 0.000 *** 
sd10 0.026 0.011 0.015 * 0.008 0.007 0.221  0.006 0.005 0.015 * 
sd11 0.009 0.010 0.377  0.016 0.007 0.016 * 0.007 0.005 0.377  
Quota.EU -0.008 0.008 0.334  0.000 0.005 0.942  0.004 0.004 0.334  
Freetrade -0.010 0.010 0.298  -0.001 0.006 0.872  -0.007 0.005 0.298  
                          
Resid. st. er-
ror 0.029 on 183 DF 
 
0.019 on 183 DF 
 
0.014 on 183 DF 
 












F-stat 4.126 on 21 and 183 DF 
 
1.495 on 21 and 183 DF 
 
0.894 on 21 and 183 DF 
 
p-value 6.67E-08   0.001   0.599 
 
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1, all variables in first differences and logarithmic transformation 
DF = degrees of freedom, l =lagged, Freetrade = cheese-free-trade-dummy: 0 before, 1 after 07/2007, Quota.EU = end-of-
EU-quota dummy: 0 before, 1 after 04/2015, sd = seasonal dummy 
 
 
III   Vertical Price Transmission in Swiss Dairy and Cheese Value Chains 
47 
III Vertical Price Transmission in Swiss Dairy and Cheese Value 
Chains 
Author: Judith Hillen 
Abstract 
In Switzerland, there are separated value chains for dairy and cheese products, which differ in 
terms of industry concentration, value chain governance, and product characteristics. We ana-
lyze how milk prices are passed on along these different value chains. Using detailed price data 
on farm-gate, wholesale, export, and retail levels, we apply asymmetric Vector Autoregressive 
and Vector Error Correction Models to study vertical price transmission in Swiss dairy and 
cheese chains. Contrary to most existing literature, we find almost no long-run price relation-
ships and no significant asymmetries between the different stages and products and discuss the 
potential reasons. 
KEYWORDS: price transmission, value chains, Switzerland, milk prices 
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1 Introduction 
Vertical price transmission in milk markets has received considerable research attention in the 
past decades, as prices are a main link between different market levels and are an important 
factor for agricultural efficiency (Serra and Goodwin 2003). Also, in Switzerland, there is a 
long-lasting and vivid public debate about milk prices, especially at the producer level, with 
strong opinions about “fair” or “unfair” milk prices (e.g., Cornall 2017). Lately, Swiss dairy 
market organizations and agricultural consultants have given some attention to how more value 
can be retained by producers (SBV 2013, Reviron et al. 2017). Yet, the relationships between 
prices at different stages of the dairy and cheese value chains have not yet been analyzed sys-
tematically and quantified. Therefore, this study analyzes vertical price transmission in the 
Swiss milk market. 
For other countries, numerous studies have examined the price relationships in different milk 
and dairy markets. Table 1 provides an overview of existing studies dealing with vertical milk 
price transmission.5 More than 60% of these 21 studies focus exclusively on farm-gate and 
retail prices; the remaining also include wholesale or processor levels, but only two studies 
include the three stages (farm-gate, processing/wholesale, and retail) (Jaffry and Grigoryev 
2011, Kharin et al. 2017). While the specific focus differs among these studies, the majority 
finds long-run price transmission elasticities with positive asymmetries in the long- and/or 
short-run. This implies that price increases are passed on at a greater magnitude/speed than 
price decreases. Only one study finds no vertical long-run relationship (Kharin 2015); this is 
for Russian farm and retail milk prices. Also, the findings regarding the direction of price trans-
mission are consistent across most case studies, which find that prices are passed on down-
stream, that is, either from producer or wholesale to retail prices. This is in line with the concept 
of mark-up pricing (Tirole 1988). Only Bakucz et al. (2012) find that in Poland, retail price 
changes cause farm-gate price changes. 
Despite the large number of case studies available, we want to add another one for Switzerland 
for the following reasons. First, highly detailed price data are available. We are able to include 
four value chain levels: farm-gate, wholesale, export, and retail prices. These data are available 
for a large number of products, including cheese, dairy, and organic products at the retail level 
and corresponding producer prices, separated by processing use, at the farm-gate level. Hence, 
we are able to analyze and compare price transmission along different value chains in the dairy, 
                                                 
5 Studies analyzing multiple products are not included, nor are unpublished studies with unclear results or low 
numbers of observations and studies published before the year 2000. 
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cheese, and organic sector. A second reason is that in Switzerland, those chains are strictly 
separated and differ in terms of industry concentration, value chain governance, and product 
characteristics. This allows us to derive insights on the reasons for different magnitude, speed, 
and (a)symmetry of price transmission. 
Table 1: Literature review of existing vertical milk price transmission studies 
Authors Time period Method Region Level Products Frequ. Coint. Asymm. 
Acosta & Valdes 
(2013) 



















Bakucs, Fałkowski & 
Fertő (2012) 
1995-2007 Asymm. VECM 
Poland and 
Hungary 














1977, Heien 1980) 
5 New York 
State cities 




Bor, Ismihan & Baya-
ner (2014) 




Capps & Sherwell 
(2007) 
1994-2002 Asymm. ECM 
Seven US ci-
ties 




Chavas & Mehta 
(2004) 

























spo Cuaresma (2010) 







Jaffry & Grigoryev 
(2011) 
1989*-2010 Asymm. ECM 
United King-
dom 



















Lass (2005) 1982-2001 








Liu, Rabinowitz & 
Xuan (2017) 





gen & Glauben 
(2015) 
2005-2008 panel TVECM  Germany W, R 
milk, but-
ter 
weekly yes pos. 
Serra & Goodwin 
(2003) 
1994-2000 Asymm. TVECM Spain F, R 
14 pro-
ducts 
weekly yes pos. 
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mial ECM  










ADL = autoregressive distributed lags model, MUM = Mark-Up Model, (T)(V)ECM = (Threshold) (Vector) Error Correc-
tion Model, VAR = Vector autoregressive, F = Farmgate, Pr = Processor, R = Retail, W= Wholesale, n/a: not tested 
* Varying starting points from 1989 -2007, depending on availability. For a more detailed overview on US milk price trans-
mission studies, see US Government Accountability Office (2004), pp. 136 - 149. 
2 Framework 
The milk sector is of key importance for Swiss agriculture, representing about 25% of the na-
tional agricultural production value (SBV 2013). As about 44% of all Swiss farms engage in 
milk production, the milk price is highly relevant for farm income (SBV 2013). 
2.1 Structure of the Swiss milk market 
In Switzerland, the processing channels for cheese and other dairy products are strictly sepa-
rated; about 43% of Swiss raw milk is processed into cheese, and the remaining 57% is pro-
cessed into other, non-cheese dairy products (SMP 2019). 
The farm level is characterized by many small-scale farmers, even though some structural 
change with decreasing numbers of dairy farms and increasing farm sizes has occurred in the 
past decades. In 2017, dairy farms had on average 25 cows and produced 158 tons of milk per 
year (TSM et al. 2017). Yet, there is large heterogeneity on the farm level; farms that supply 
raw milk to artisanal cheese dairies, especially those under protected designation of origin (36% 
of all dairy farmers), must fulfill certain specifications regarding production region and feeding, 
for example, not feeding dairy cows silage fodder. Farms that supply milk to industrial dairies 
produce rather homogeneous raw milk without such restrictions (Flury et al. 2014). Therefore, 
producer prices depend on the processing used and are generally higher for milk processed into 
cheese, partly thanks to a targeted subsidy payment for cheese processing.6 
The structure, concentration, and governance of the milk processing industry also differs be-
tween the “artisanal” cheese and the “industrial” dairy processing systems. In the artisanal 
cheese production of matured hard- and semi-hard cheese, only raw milk from silage-free pro-
duction is used. There are several hundred regional and artisanal cheese dairies of varying sizes. 
                                                 
6 The Swiss payment for milk processed into cheese was introduced in 1999 to help farmers and processors dealing with the 
liberalization of the cheese market with the European Union, enhancing competitiveness with EU producers and stabilizing 
income. The Swiss government pays this subsidy (initially 0.20 CHF, currently 0.15 CHF per liter) to the cheese dairies 
who are supposed to pass it on to the milk producers. As the Swiss dairy market, that is, all non-cheese milk products, are 
still protected by tariffs and tariff rate quotas, this payment is meant to offset this difference in border protection (for details, 
see Finger et al. 2017). 
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These dairies usually belong to the local producer association, or at least there is a close link 
between producers, dairies, and maturing companies, as they are jointly organized in brand 
associations (Reviron et al. 2004). Among those artisanal cheese types, 12 are under the pro-
tected designation of origin (AOP, Appellation d’Origine Protegée), and therefore restricted 
to specific geographic regions. Emmentaler and Gruyère are the most well-known and most 
produced AOP cheese varieties (TSM et al. 2017). Artisanal processors depend on a reliable 
supply of raw milk that fulfills the specific regional and quality criteria. Therefore, they 
need to provide producers with sufficient incentives to stay in milk production and to make 
the specific investments necessary to deliver the required quality. In contrast, the dairy pro-
cessing industry is dominated by a few large companies that are supplied by “generic” raw milk 
producers, who only need to fulfil national quality standards. They produce all kinds of stand-
ardized (e.g., butter, milk powder) and speciality dairy products (e.g., deserts, ice cream) and 
some industrial cheese types made from pasteurized milk, such as mozzarella and cream cheese 
(Haller 2014). Producers deliver their milk either to a producer association or directly to one of 
the dairies. Either way, after selling to this first milk buyer, producers cannot trace how their 
milk is processed and marketed. 
At the retail stage, concentration is very high, often described as a duopoly, because two retail-
ers (Coop and Migros) account for more than 70% of the market share (EDA 2017). Migros 
has its own dairy processor (Elsa), while Coop is mainly supplied by Emmi, Switzerland’s 
largest dairy company. In the mid-2000s, two discounters (Aldi and Lidl) entered the Swiss 
market, but in 2016, they jointly reached only 2.8% of the overall retail market share, and 8.3% 
of the food retail market share (EDA 2017). 
2.2 Potential influence on vertical price transmission 
The different characteristics of the Swiss dairy and cheese processing chains could have an 
influence on price transmission along the value chains. Our hypothesis is that there is high and 
symmetric price transmission in artisanal cheese processing, and low and asymmetric price 
transmission in industrial dairy processing chains. 
In the artisanal cheese chain, one would expect high price transmission because of the high 
price transparency between different stages; most cheese dairies produce one or few specific 
types of cheese. Hence, producers or cheese processors can trace down the price at which their 
products are sold at downstream stages and can detect increased margins. The predominant 
cheese value chain governance structures are hybrid forms classified as “relational networks” 
and “leadership” (Reviron et al. 2017), with close coordination between the different sellers 
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and buyers. This allows for intensive producer participation in downstream decision-making 
processes, for instance, regarding marketing channels or quantity control, and hence implicitly, 
pricing decisions. However, in contrast to spot markets, where prices coordinate supply and 
demand, in these hybrid governance forms, there are longer-term relational contracts between 
buyer and seller (Ménard 2004 and 2018). Such contractually fixed prices, or price spans, may 
prohibit an immediate pass-through of changing costs or prices. Finally, the cheese value chain 
is characterized by many small cheese dairies and low firm concentration. However, this rela-
tionship between concentration, market power, and price transmission behavior is not yet fully 
understood. Whereas some early literature argued that high industry concentration caused im-
perfect, asymmetric price transmission (Kinnucan and Forker 1987), this direct relationship has 
been questioned theoretically (McCorriston et al. 2001, Weldegebriel 2004) and empirically 
(Peltzman 2000, Aguiar and Santana 2002). 
In the industrial dairy processing chain, one would expect imperfect (i.e., low and asymmetric) 
price transmission because of the following characteristics. There is almost no price transpar-
ency along the value chain. Especially for dairy farmers, traceability stops at first milk pur-
chaser, that is, either to a producer organization or directly to an industrial dairy. Loose gov-
ernance forms (classified as “Trust” according to Reviron et al. 2017) foster this problem of 
asymmetric information. Producers are not involved in any downstream activities and therefore 
do not know how their milk will be processed and sold further, and at what price. The milk they 
deliver could be processed into cheap milk powder for world market export or into premium 
ice cream. The high concentration at the processor level presumably allows for the execution 
of market power, but again, the direction and strength of the effect on price transmission is not 
so clear, and empirical evidence is mixed (e.g., Cutts and Kirsten 2006, Loy et al. 2018). 
3 Data and Methods 
3.1 Data 
We used monthly Swiss prices from January 2004 until March 2018, collected at farm-gate (F), 
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Table 2: Data description of all used Swiss dairy and cheese prices 
  Variable Description Measure Time period Source Mean Sd 
Farm-gate producer price         
 P_dai For production of any non-cheese products Rp./kg 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 64.10 7.30 
 P_che_art For artisan cheese production, silage-free feeding Rp./kg 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 73.29 2.82 
 P_emm For Emmentaler AOP cheese production Rp./kg 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 66.91 5.03 
 P_gru For Gruyère AOP cheese production Rp./kg 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 80.75 2.32 
 P_che_ind For cheese production by industrial dairies7 Rp./kg 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 65.39 6.87 
  P_org 
Organic raw milk for any processing channel, 
standards defined by Bio Suisse (2015) 
Rp./kg 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 79.72 4.80 
Export price*         
 E_hard all hard cheese. TL 0406.9099 CHF/kg 1/2004-3/2018 FCA 9.66 0.69 
 E_semi all semi-hard cheese. TL 0406.9091 CHF/kg 1/2004-3/2018 FCA 10.74 1.55 
 E_emm Emmentaler cheese (AOP) CHF/kg 1/2004-5/2017 FCA 8.59 0.83 
 E_gru Gruyère cheese (AOP) CHF/kg 1/2004-5/2017 FCA 12.81 0.74 
  E_melt Melted cheese, not grated or powder, TL 0406.30 CHF/kg 1/2004-3/2018 FCA 7.50 0.68 
Wholesale price         
 W_but Butter, salted or unsalted CHF/kg 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 10.08 0.70 
 W_wmp Whole milk powder, 26% fat, for food preparation CHF/kg 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 6.33 0.34 
  W_smp Skimmed milk powder, <1.5% fat, for food preparation CHF/kg 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 4.44 0.42 
Retail price         
 R_milk Pasteurized whole milk CHF/l 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 1.46 0.06 
 R_but Butter for cooking («Die Butter») CHF/250g 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 2.98 0.15 
 R_emm Emmentaler surchoix CHF/kg 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 19.03 0.90 
 R_gru Gruyère surchoix CHF/kg 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 19.89 0.72 
 R_app Appenzeller surchoix CHF/kg 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 18.96 0.93 
 R_mozz Mozzarella CHF/150g 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 1.74 0.27 
 R_racl Raclette (block) CHF/kg 1/2004-3/2018 FOAG 19.59 1.21 
 R_milk_org Organic pasteurized whole milk CHF/l 1/2006-3/2018 FOAG 1.77 0.04 
 R_but_org Organic butter («Vorzugsbutter») CHF/200g 1/2006-3/2018 FOAG 3.84 0.12 
 R_emm_org Organic Emmentaler CHF/kg 1/2006-3/2018 FOAG 20.20 1.03 
 R_gru_org Organic Gruyère CHF/kg 1/2006-3/2018 FOAG 21.01 0.71 
  R_mozz_org Organic Mozzarella CHF/150g 1/2006-3/2018 FOAG 2.27 0.17 
AOP= protected designation of origin (Appellation d’Origine Protegée), CHF = Swiss Francs, FCA = Swiss Federal Customs 
Administration, FOAG = Swiss Federal Office for Agriculture, Rp.=Rappen (0.01CHF), TL = tariff line 
* Export prices for dairy products (e.g., fluid milk, butter, milk powder) are available, but excluded from the analysis due to 
high product heterogeneity and very low trading volumes leading to highly volatile export unit values. 
                                                 
7 Industrial cheese includes all non-artisanal cheese production by large dairies, such as Mozzarella and numerous semi-hard, fresh and soft 
cheese types that can be made from pasteurized milk. In contrast to raw milk for artisan cheese production, raw milk for industrial cheese 
production is not subject to strict specifications: The use of silage fodder is allowed und there are no geographic origin restrictions. In fact, 
the requirements are the same as for the production of other dairy products. Hence, this producer price is closely related with the producer 
price for dairy milk: The farmers deliver their milk to one of the large dairies (either directly or via an intermediary first milk buyer), where 
it is pooled and processed into various dairy products, including industrially processed cheese. These large dairies (or other first milk 
buyers, such as producer organizations) report how much milk was processed into cheese. This is well-documented, because with some 
minor exceptions (small amounts of low fat cheese), the processors receive the cheese processing aid for these quantities. 
III   Vertical Price Transmission in Swiss Dairy and Cheese Value Chains 
54 
All farm-gate producer prices represent monthly weighted averages of the prices received by 
the farmers for raw milk. To ensure comparability across different producer prices, prices in-
clude only the processing aid for cheese and no other duties or bonuses such as the subsidy for 
silage-free production. We included six different producer prices. Figure 1 shows how the in-
cluded prices are related, and how they can be grouped into different value chains. Those prices 
connected by an arrow are jointly analyzed regarding price transmission. Figures A1-A5 in the 
appendix illustrate the nominal price development over time. 
 
Figure 1: Relationships between included milk, dairy and cheese prices 
Source: own representation 
3.2 Methodology 
Seeking consistency and allowing for better comparability with other case studies (see Table 
1), we followed the most widely used methodology for vertical price transmission analysis: 
Pairwise Johansen tests and subsequent Vector Error Correction Models (VECM) for cointe-
grated prices, or Vector Autoregressive Models (VAR) in first differences for non-cointegrated 
prices. Additionally, we tested for non-linear threshold cointegration, as well as for short- and 
long-run asymmetry. For detailed information on asymmetric price transmission models and 
their specifications, see review papers by Frey and Manera (2007) and Meyer and von Cramon-
Taubadel (2004). 
3.2.1 Unit root and cointegration tests 
First, we analyzed the individual price series properties by applying lag‐order selection criteria, 
standard Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin 
(KPSS) stationarity tests. Second, for each potentially related price pair in one value chain 
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(compare Figure 1), we tested the null hypothesis of no cointegration against linear cointegra-
tion by applying Johansen (1988) trace and eigenvalue tests and accounted for seasonality. 
However, this approach requires symmetric relationship between the prices. As we were also 
interested in potential asymmetries, we further tested for threshold cointegration as developed 
by Balke and Fomby (1997) and Enders and Granger (1998). We followed a model specification 
by Enders and Siklos (2001) with two-regime threshold cointegration. Like the linear Engle-
Granger (1987) two-stage approach, it first models a long-run cointegrating relationship be-
tween the two prices: 
(1)   𝑝2𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝1𝑡 + 𝑡 
In contrast to the linear model, the residuals of this cointegrating relationship can differ between 
the two regimes by including a Heaviside indicator 𝐼𝑡: 
(2)  𝛥 ?̂? = 𝜌1𝐼𝑡 ?̂?−1 + 𝜌2(1 − 𝐼𝑡) ?̂?−1 + ∑ 𝜑
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝛥 ?̂?−𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡, with 
(3)   𝐼𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓  ?̂?−1  ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise; or 
(4)   𝐼𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝛥 ?̂?−1 ≥ 0, and 0 otherwise 
K is the number of lags, selected by minimizing AIC. The Heaviside indicator for the threshold 
can be specified in two different ways. If it depends on the lagged residual in levels (Equation 
3), we get a Threshold Autoregression (TAR) model. If it depends on changes of the lagged 
residual (Equation 4), we get a Momentum Threshold Autoregression (MTAR) model. While 
the TAR model accounts for asymmetric “deep” movement, the MTAR model is more con-
cerned with asymmetries in “steep” variations and adjustments. For a detailed discussion on the 
two models, see Enders and Granger (1998), Enders and Siklos (2001), and Sun (2011). We 
specified both TAR and MTAR models and decided based on AIC, which one was more accu-
rate, as recommended by Enders and Siklos (2001). For both cases, we set the threshold value 
equal to zero because we were interested in comparable asymmetries across product pairs.8 
These models allow for asymmetric long-run adjustment. To test whether this long-run rela-
tionship is significant, we applied F-tests with the null of no cointegration (𝐻01: 𝜌1 = 𝜌2 = 0) 
                                                 
8 Alternatively, there are search methods to determine consistent estimates for the threshold value (Chan 1993). 
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against the estimated threshold cointegration.9 Additionally, we tested the null of linear, sym-
metric cointegration (𝐻02: 𝜌1 = 𝜌2) with a standard F-test.
10 
3.2.2 VECM and VAR models 
Depending on the outcome of the linear and threshold cointegration tests, we chose different 
models to estimate the pairwise price transmission. For linearly cointegrated price pairs, we 























p1 and p2 represent the two respective prices (in logarithms), 𝛥 denotes changes in first differ-
ences, 𝑀𝑡 are monthly dummy variables (1‒11) to capture seasonality, and lag length k is cho-
sen according to a minimized Bayesian information criterion (BIC). The Error Correction Term 
(ECT) measures how previous periods departed from the long‐run equilibrium, including a con-
stant in cointegration (𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 = 𝑝2𝑡−1 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑝1𝑡). The ECT hence represents the cointe-
grating vector and is zero in the long-run. Over time, however, positive or negative deviations 
can occur, as the prices can meander loosely around this equilibrium. Given the construction of 
the ECT, for an adjustment towards the joint equilibrium zero, we expect 𝛼𝑝1 to be negative 
and 𝛼𝑝2 to be positive. For threshold-integrated price pairs, and to account for asymmetries, we 














































The error correction term is based on threshold cointegration (see Equations 2-4), and therefore 
defined slightly differently and denoted as E, instead of ECT. We split it into 𝐸𝑡−1
+ =  𝐼𝑡  ?̂?−1 
and 𝐸𝑡−1
− =  (1 − 𝐼𝑡) ?̂?−1, with the Heaviside indicator depending on the model specification 
(TAR or MTAR) and the threshold set equal to zero. To account for asymmetries, we split E 
into positive and negative values and estimated separate error correcting coefficients 𝛼+ and 
                                                 
9 Due to a non-normal test statistical distribution, we used the critical values listed in Enders and Siklos (2001) and extended 
by Wane et al. (2004). 
10 We chose this procedure over the Hansen-Seo test (2002), which also tests the null hypothesis of linear cointegration against 
the alternative of threshold cointegration, because of its low power in the presence of asymmetric adjustment. Indeed, for 
our sample, the Hansen-Seo test did not reject the null of linear cointegration for any of the price pairs (see Appendix Table 
A4). 
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𝛼− to see whether the adjustment took place at a different speed for positive and negative de-
viations. We tested whether this difference was significant for each equation by testing H03: 
𝛼𝑝1
+ = 𝛼𝑝1
− and H04: 𝛼𝑝2
+ = 𝛼𝑝2
−. 
Also, autoregressive effects and lagged variables of each price can incorporate asymmetries. 
Therefore, we tested for a cumulative asymmetric effects of the lagged price values of one 
variable on the other: H05: ∑ [𝛿𝑝1𝑗
+  𝜌𝑝1𝑗
+ ] 𝑘𝑖=1 = ∑ [𝛿𝑝1𝑗
−  𝜌𝑝1𝑗
− ] 𝑘𝑖=1 for the influence of lagged p1 
changes on Δp2t; and H06: ∑ [𝛿𝑝2𝑗
+  𝜌𝑝2𝑗
+ ] 𝑘𝑖=1 = ∑ [𝛿𝑝2𝑗
−  𝜌𝑝2𝑗
− ] 𝑘𝑖=1 for lagged p2 changes on Δp1t. 
One can also test for asymmetric effects of individual price lags (see Frey and Manera 2007, 
Sun 2011), but because of the large number of price pairs tested, we did not apply such a test 
here. 
For non-cointegrated prices, we set up VAR models in first differences (equation 7). In this 
case, there was no long-run relationship between the prices. Yet, we allowed for asymmetric 
short-term effects by splitting the lagged values into positive and negative values (equation 8). 
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For price pairs with weak or nearly significant cointegration, we tried different model specifi-
cations to see ex-post, whether or not there was an economically meaningful long-run (thresh-
old) cointegration and reported the model with the best fit.11 
4 Results 
4.1 Unit root and cointegration test results 
Before specifying the models, we carefully tested all price series individually, and then pairwise 
on their statistical properties. Figure 2 illustrates the testing procedure and the results schemat-
ically, while the detailed test results are documented in appendix tables A1 – A3. 
                                                 
11 For value chains with prices of three stages available, we also tested for joint cointegration and price transmission among 
all three prices simultaneously, including producer, export or wholesale, and retail price as endogenous variables. As the 
results were qualitatively the same and parameter comparison and interpretation was easier for price pairs, we only reported 
pairwise model results here. Results for the overall value chain models are available on request. 
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Figure 2: Schematic summary of unit root and cointegration tests 
 
Unit root and stationarity tests clearly identified most price series as integrated of order one 
(I(1)). For some prices, however, both the null of stationarity (KPSS) and of a unit root (ADF) 
could not be rejected. For these cases, we checked for fractional integration by applying the 
Whittle estimator, introduced by Künsch (1987) and tested for consistency in the unit root case 
by Phillips and Shimotsu (2004). We found that on a 1% significance level, a rank=1, that is, a 
unit root, could not be rejected and therefore continued to treat all prices as I(1) processes. 
Next, we executed Johansen trace and eigenvalue tests for linear cointegration, including a con-
stant in cointegration, seasonal dummies, and lag length according to BIC. Only for one out of 
24 price pairs, the null of no cointegration (r=0) could clearly be rejected at the 1% significance 
level in both test specifications: for the relationship between butter wholesale and retail prices. 
For the three Gruyère price pairs and for the relationship between organic producer prices and 
retail prices of organic milk and butter, the results were not clear. Here, the null of no cointe-
gration was rejected between the 1% and 10% level, depending on the test specification.12 For 
                                                 
12 In both trace and eigenvalue, as in small samples, the trace tests can be more distorted, whereas the maximum 
eigenvalue tests can have a lower power (Lütkepohl et al. 2001). In our case, both tests led to very similar 
conclusions. 
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these cases, we set up VECMs and check ex-post whether there is meaningful cointegration. 
For all other price pairs, the Johansen test found no long-run cointegration. 
Threshold cointegration with asymmetric adjustment, as described in section 3, was only found 
between Gruyère producers and export prices, and is best specified by the MTAR model. Be-
tween butter wholesale and retail prices, the test rejected the null of no cointegration (H02: 
ρ1=ρ2=0) for both the TAR and MTAR specification, but without significant threshold effects 
or asymmetric adjustment. Hence, we consider this price pair linearly cointegrated, as found by 
the Johansen test. For some other price pairs in the MTAR model, the symmetric adjustment 
hypothesis (H02: ρ1=ρ2) was rejected at the 5% level, but the cointegration link itself was not 
significant. 
4.2 Vector error correction model results 
Table 3 shows the linear VECM specialization for the price pairs considered cointegrated by 
the Johansen test. In the dairy chain, we estimated a linear price transmission elasticity of 0.82 
from butter wholesale to retail prices, with the retail price adjusting to the joint equilibrium (αp2 
=0.17), and some weak reaction by the wholesale price (αp1=0.03), but into an error amplifying, 
rather than error correcting direction. In the cheese chain, Gruyère producers and export prices 
both seemed to follow the retail price (α of -0.16 and -0.10), implying an upstream price trans-
mission. For organic prices, retail milk and butter adapted to a joint equilibrium with the organic 
producer price, but also at a rather low speed (milk: 8% error correction per month; butter 12% 
error correction per month) and at a negative price transmission elasticity, indicating that prices 
would move into opposite directions, which was surprising and did not make sense economi-
cally. Therefore, we additionally estimated VAR models, assuming no meaningful cointegra-
tion. For all the linearly cointegrated price pairs, splitting the ECT into positive and negative 
values and applying F-tests revealed that there were no significant asymmetries in adjustment 
(Appendix Table A5). Therefore, we adhered to the more parsimonious symmetric model. 
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Table 3: Key parameters of linear VECM specification for cointegrated price pairs 
Tested variable pair  Coint. Vector   Adjustment parameters  Model Fit  Asymmetry test 
p1   p2 lags 
PT 
elast. 










Dairy chain  
         
    
 
     
W_but 
 
R_but 2 0.82  0.50   0.03 *  0.17 ***  0.00 0.20  n.s. n.s. 
Cheese chain  
         
    
 
     
P_gru  R_gru 4 0.35  -5.44   -0.16 ***  0.02 (n.s.)  0.28 0.47  n.s. n.s. 
E_gru  R_gru 4 1.94  -8.37   -0.10 ***  0.00 (n.s.)  0.24 0.51  n.s. n.s. 
Organic chain  
             
   








0.68 0.09  n.s. n.s. 
P_org   R_but_org 2 -0.89   -3.17     -0.04 (n.s.)   0.12 ***   0.68  0.18  n.s. n.s. 
Note: */ **/*** represent 10/5/1% significance level, (n.s.) = not significant at 10% level; ECT = error correction term 
Model with prices in logarithms, incl. 11 seasonal dummies, lag selection acc. to Schwarz criterion. Split pos. and neg. 
ECT not listed here, as none of the differences proved significant (see appendix). 
The threshold cointegration test identified only one price pair to be threshold cointegrated and 
asymmetrically related; the Gruyère producer and export price, for which the threshold VECM 
specification is reported in Table 4. The adjustment parameters α of both the producer and 
export price are only partly significant, with significant adjustment by the producer price and 
no significant asymmetry in the export price adjustment. This means that producer prices re-
spond faster to price increases than to decreases in export prices. Further, some short-term 
asymmetries were found; while negative past producer price changes influence the export price 
(Δp1_l1.neg=0.35), positive changes do not. Even through the cointegrating relationship and 
these parameters are statistically significant, the overall model fit is quite weak (Adj.R2 =0.11 
and 0.15 for both response equations), hinting at weak cointegration and adjustment processes. 
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Table 4: Asymmetric Threshold VECM results for Gruyère producer – export prices 





















α+ = α- (H03 and H04) 16.26 *** 0.60 
 
Cumulative Δp1+ = Cumulative Δp1- (H05) 0.12 
 
3.86 * 








*/ **/*** represent 10/5/1% significance level 
Model specification based on previous threshold cointegration tests: MTAR model with 1 lag and threshold set to zero. Coin-
tegrating vector: p2-1.13p1+2.41. To test for cumulative asymmetric effects, the effect on the respective other price matters 
(H05: column 2, H06: column 1). 
Note: We changed the ECT signs from the original R output, based on package APT, to be consistent with the sign interpreta-
tion of the linear VECM output in Table 3. For the R package documentation, see https://cran.r-project.org/package=apt.  
4.3 Vector autoregressive model results 
For the remaining non-cointegrated price pairs, we set up VAR models in first differences. 
Table 5 summarizes the key parameters. We can see that there are only few cross-effects be-
tween the price pairs (Δp1.lagged influencing Δp2 and vice versa). Along the dairy chain, past 
producer price changes positively influence wholesale prices (butter and milk powder), and the 
organic producer price positively influences the organic butter and mozzarella price. Further, 
we tested for short-term asymmetries through cumulative asymmetric effects of past p1-
changes on Δp2t (H05) and of past p2-changes on the Δp1t (H06) but could not detect any asym-
metries. For none of the price pairs in either direction, the null hypothesis of symmetric cumu-
lative lag effects can be rejected at a 5% significance level (see Table A6 in the appendix for 
details). 
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Table 5: Key parameters of VAR in first difference model for non-cointegrated price 
pairs 
Tested variable pair P1-equation    P2-equation    Model Fit 
P1   P2 ΔP1.l1 ΔP1.l2 ΔP2.l1 ΔP2.l2   ΔP1.l1 ΔP1.l2 ΔP2.l1 ΔP2.l2   
adj.R2    
p1-equ. 
adj.R2     
p2-equ. 
Dairy chain 
                   
  











P_dai  W_smp 0.14 
 



































0.17 * 0.09 
 




                   
  








0.12  -0.07 
 
-0.17 ** 0.07 
 
0.64 0.04 
P_che_ind R_racl -0.05 
 
0.18 ** 0.10 ** 0.07 
 
-0.13  0.21 
 
-0.70 *** -0.39 *** 
 
0.65 0.42 
P_che_ind E_melt -0.09  0.14 * -0.01  -0.02  0.31  0.12  -0.64 *** -0.41  0.64 0.29 








0.00  0.09 
 
-0.22 *** -0.14 * 
 
0.29 0.22 




0.03 * 0.00 
 
0.13  0.50 
 
-0.25 *** -0.19 ** 
 
0.30 0.27 
P_che_art R_app 0.09  0.03  -0.05 -0.05  -0.03  0.18 -0.62 *** -0.13  0.29 0.29 
E_semi R_app -0.25  -0.20  0.05 0.08  0.05  0.06 -0.62 *** -0.11  0.26 0.31 




0.12 * -0.02 
 













0.04  -0.01 
 
-0.63 *** -0.11 
 
0.23 0.31 








0.17 ** 0.12 
 








R_milk_org -0.17 * 0.14  0.06  0.10   0.11 * 0.08  -0.39 *** -0.25 ***  0.68 0.08 
P_org 
 
R_but_org -0.15 * 0.15 * 0.13  -0.04   0.11 * 0.24 *** -0.32 *** -0.16 **  0.69 0.20 
P_org 
 
R_emm_org -0.16 * 0.17 * 0.04  -0.01   -0.18  -0.05  -0.47 *** -0.07  0.68 0.21 
P_org 
 
R_gru_org -0.15 * 0.16 * -0.03  0.02   -0.07  0.12  -0.43 *** -0.33 ***  0.68 0.17 
P_org R_mozz_org -0.15 * 0.16 * 0.12 * 0.12 *   0.31 *** 0.19 * -0.49 *** -0.23 ***   0.69 0.24 
Note: */ **/*** represent 10/5/1% significance level; lag selection acc. to AIC 
Included variables: logged variables, monthly dummies for raw milk, 2 lags (following BIC), constant as deterministic re-
gressor 
5 Discussion 
5.1 Summary and integration of the results 
The analysis of price transmission along Swiss dairy and cheese chains revealed only weak 
price links between prices at different value chain levels, as Figure 3 illustrates. We found no 
convincing evidence for long-run vertical price transmission, neither in dairy nor cheese chains. 
Even the few price pairs (six out of 24), which seem (threshold) cointegrated, do not allow us 
to draw clear conclusions; they are partly found in the dairy chain (W_but, R_but), cheese chain 
(all Gruyère levels), and organic chain (P_org, R_milk/but_org). In all cases, the estimated 
speed of price transmission is rather low, with less than 20% of the temporary disequilibrium 
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corrected for within one month, and rather poor model fit for the response equation of the ad-
justing price (Adj.R2 < 0.3). An asymmetric relationship was only identified between Gruyère 
producers and export prices, with positive asymmetric adjustment by the producer price. This 
means that increases in export prices are passed on to producer prices more strongly than de-
creases in export prices. 
 
Figure 3: Illustrative result summary of price transmission along Swiss milk chains 
 
Our results are contrary to previous findings for milk markets in several developed and devel-
oping countries, as most of them find long-run asymmetric price transmission (see Table 1). 
Often, such imperfect or lacking price transmission is interpreted as a consequence of market 
power exercised by highly concentrated, rent-capturing processors or retailers. However, we 
could not confirm that price pass-through is less complete in the highly concentrated dairy sec-
tor than in artisanal and AOP cheese value chains with less, and more closely linked actors. 
Also higher price transparency between different stages in specialized artisanal cheese pro-
cessing than for the industrial dairy processing does not lead to systematic differences in verti-
cal price transmission behavior. Hence, our analysis could not confirm our initial hypothesis of 
faster and more complete price pass-through in cheese than in dairy markets. In the following, 
we discuss other potential reasons for the weak price transmission links in Swiss milk and 
cheese chains. 
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5.2 Potential reasons for low or weak price transmission 
In the literature, several reasons for weak price transmission besides market power have been 
identified including the existence of inventory stocks, menu costs to changing prices, or con-
tracts with fixed prices (e.g., Vavra and Goodwin 2005). All of them may apply in our case as 
in any other case. Additionally, there are factors that apply specifically to our analysis, such as 
statistical properties of the used price data, and Switzerland-specific factors, which we will 
discuss next. 
5.2.1 Statistical properties of price series 
The most straightforward explanation may be our limited data availability. Our sample size of 
171 observations per price series is rather small. Especially if error correction is slow, markets 
spend long periods out of equilibrium, making the equilibrium, i.e., a cointegrating relationship, 
itself harder to detect. This is even more the case when non-linearities and structural breaks are 
present, i.e., when there is not one constant long-run relationship. Moreover, we work with 
monthly price data. Hence, any variation that takes place within a month is averaged away, and 
with it much possible evidence of error correction at higher frequencies. 
Further, the statistical properties of the included export and retail price series may bias the 
results of cointegration and adjustment estimates. 
For retail data, there are two major issues influencing price transmission estimation: temporary 
sales promotions and aggregation across retailers. In food retail, promotional sales are a fre-
quent phenomenon, that is, significant temporary price reductions that are unrelated to cost 
changes (Hosken and Reiffen 2001). As such promotions are marketing tools and not part of 
the cost pass-through, they can bias the results of price transmission analysis, or at least de-
crease the efficiency of estimation by adding unexplained price variations. Hence, it has been 
suggested they be filtered out (Tifaoui and von Cramon-Taubadel 2017). Yet, even then, scan-
ner data studies have shown that the remaining reference prices follow discontinuous jump 
processes and thus do not allow for cointegration models, which assume continuous adjustment 
(Chahrour 2011, Loy et al. 2015). The downward-spikes in our price series (see appendix, es-
pecially figures A4, A5) and the observable pricing strategies of Swiss retailers hint at such 
temporary promotions. However, we used aggregate data and cannot clearly identify and re-
move promotional sales prices. Further, the prices are aggregated across several retailers. As 
von Cramon-Taubadel et al. (2006) showed, this can lead to miss-specified estimations of the 
actual price transmission at the individual store level. The Swiss retail price data do not include 
discount stores, such as Aldi and Lidl, but only the largest retailers. While the discount market 
III   Vertical Price Transmission in Swiss Dairy and Cheese Value Chains 
65 
share is still rather low (jointly 8.3% in food retail, EDA 2017), they may still convey important 
price signals to the other players (Ailawadi and Keller 2004). 
Also export prices are not necessarily good representatives of the overall price development. 
One issue is that export prices depend on the quality of the exported products (Hallak 2006). 
Therefore, we only included export prices for narrow product groups with comparable qualities, 
such as the AOP cheese brands, Emmentaler and Gruyère, or melted cheese. Still, we observed 
large short-term variations in export prices, which may depend on the quantities traded, package 
sizes, and remaining heterogeneity within the product categories, such as different age and rip-
ening processes. 
Consequently, for price transmission involving export or retail data, it is not surprising to see 
such little evidence of cointegration and adjustment. Yet, a visual inspection of the price series 
(appendix figures A1-A5) shows there is no apparent co-movement. Hence, it cannot be only 
due to data issues that we found no links between most of the prices. 
5.2.2 Industry structure 
In Section 2, we described the structure and characteristics of Swiss dairy and cheese value 
chains, and how this may influence vertical price transmission. However, we did not find sys-
tematical differences by processing use; they do not seem to be the decisive factors. Rather, the 
general characteristics of the Swiss milk sector may be relevant. According to Bakucs et al. 
(2014), a fragmented farm structure and high governmental support, as present in Switzerland, 
can contribute to low, asymmetric price transmission. Moreover, perishability has been identi-
fied as another driver of imperfect price transmission (Peltzman 2000, Serra and Goodwin 2003, 
Santeramo and von Cramon-Taubadel 2016), which might be relevant for highly perishable raw 
milk, that is, transmission between producer and wholesale or export prices. 
At the retail level, the high concentration is frequently blamed for increasing market power and 
hindering price transmission, as described in Section 2. Additionally, milk products, especially 
fluid milk, are considered “signaling products” (Dickson and Urbany 1994, Binkley and Connor 
1998). These prices are the reference on which consumers evaluate the overall retailer’s price 
level. Therefore, irrespective of market power, retailers may make pricing decisions based on 
strategic considerations, and not based on the own purchase price of a specific good. Sexton 
and Xia (2018) stressed that pricing strategies are not set up and optimized for just one specific 
good, but for a larger basket of goods. There is empirical evidence that retail price setting ac-
counts for interactions within and across product categories (Richards 2006, Thomassen et al. 
2017). 
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5.2.3 High income and cost level in Switzerland 
Switzerland is a very high-income, and hence high-cost country, with an overall price level 
59% above EU average (Eurostat 2018). Therefore, it may also be that costs of non-commodity 
input prices are so high that they outweigh the changes in the agricultural input prices. This 
includes costs directly and indirectly linked to the dairy and cheese value chains, such as labor 
costs, transport, rent etc. Iten et al. (2003) and SECO (2008) showed that these costs are indeed 
higher in Switzerland than in EU countries. The fact that especially non-tradable goods and 
services are expensive can be explained by the Balassa-Samuelson effect (1964).13 Sax and 
Weder (2009) showed that this effect also holds for Switzerland. BAK Basel (2017) demon-
strated that Swiss food retailers face significantly higher input, infrastructure, and labor costs 
than their EU neighbors and pass them on to consumers through food prices. For “perfect” milk 
price transmission along the value chain, we therefore do not expect price transmission elastic-
ities to be unity, but equal to the share of the agricultural input raw milk in the industry’s or 
retailer’s cost function (McCorriston et al. 1998), which can be low in Switzerland. Yet, despite 
a lower numerical price transmission elasticity, we would expect to see a long-run relationship. 
6 Conclusion 
Our study analyzed vertical price transmission in the Swiss milk market by examining a total 
of 24 price pairs in dairy, cheese, and organic value chains. We found almost no evidence of 
long-run price transmission and no significant asymmetries for most price pairs. This result 
differs from the majority of studies in other countries, which found significant, asymmetric 
long-run price transmission, mostly from farm to retail milk prices. 
We could not identify systematic differences between different chains. Our initial hypothesis 
that prices are passed on more fully and quickly in artisanal cheese value chains with high price 
transparency than in industrialized, highly concentrated dairy chains could not be confirmed. 
Industry concentration and value chain governance structures do not seem to be the decisive 
factors for whether or not prices are passed on between different value chain levels. Therefore, 
we could not clearly identify the reason for the lack of vertical price transmission in Swiss milk 
markets. Besides data limitations, more general conditions of the Swiss market, such as the high 
cost levels, a fragmented farm structure, and high governmental support, could hinder price 
transmission along the value chains. 
                                                 
13 The Balassa-Samuelson effect states that a high productivity in the tradable, relative to the non-tradable sector causes a 
wage increase in both sectors, and consequently, a price increase for non-tradable goods and services. 
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Appendix 
Vertical Price Transmission in Swiss Dairy and Cheese Value Chains 
Figure A1: Dairy price development at producer, wholesale and retail level 
 
Figure A2: Organic price development at producer, wholesale and retail level 
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Figure A3: Industrial cheese price development at producer, export and retail level 
 
Figure A4: Artisanal cheese price development at producer, export and retail level 
 
Figure A5: Price development for Gruyère and Emmentaler 
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Table A1: Results from unit root and stationarity tests 
  Lags 
(AIC) 





       H0: I(1)  H0: I(0)   [99% range] 
Raw milk prices              
P_dai  8  -1.15 (n.s.)  1.36 ***   
P_che_art  9  -0.25 (n.s.)  0.20 (n.s.)   [0.86; 1.11] 
P_emm  7  -0.43 (n.s.)  0.91 ***   
P_gru  8  0.44 (n.s.)  1.39 ***   
P_che_ind  9  -1.37 (n.s.)  1.33 ***   
P_org  10   0.01 (n.s.)  0.44 *  [0.85; 1.12] 
Export prices              
E_hard  10  0.94 (n.s.)  0.36 *   [0.86; 1.13] 
E_semi  9  -1.17 (n.s.)  1.55 ***   
E_emm  1  0.54 (n.s.)  1.30 ***   
E_gru  5  1.17 (n.s.)  2.06 ***   
E_melt  7   -0.53 (n.s.)  0.59 **   
Wholesale prices              
W_but  1  0.62 (n.s.)  4.63 ***   
W_wmp  3  -0.52 (n.s.)  2.01 ***   
W_smp  1   -0.60 (n.s.)  4.07 ***   
Retail prices               
R_milk  4  -0.16 (n.s.)  1.02 ***   
R_but  1  -0.05 (n.s.)  2.52 ***   
R_emm  3  -0.57 (n.s.)  2.1 ***   
R_gru  4  -0.78 (n.s.)  1.58 ***   
R_app  3  -0.82 (n.s.)  2.65 ***   
R_mozz  1  -1.86 (n.s.)  7.82 ***   
R_racl  7  -0.31 (n.s.)  0.94 ***   
R_milk_org  10  0.28 (n.s.)  0.13 (n.s.)   [0.84; 1.15] 
R_but_org  3  0.02 (n.s.)  1.27 ***   
R_emm_org  6  0.10 (n.s.)  0.78 ***   
R_gru_org  4  0.46 (n.s.)  1.82 ***   
R_mozz_org  3   -1.01 (n.s.)  3.18 ***   
*/**/***: null hypothesis is rejected at 10%/5%/1% significance level, (n.s.) = not sig-
nificant at 10% level. For both tests, deterministic trends are restricted to zero. 
 
Table A2: Results from pairwise Johansen cointegration test 
Tested variable pair Trace test   Eigenvalue test 
      H0: r=0 H0: r≤1   H0: r=0 H0: r=1 
Dairy chain                  
P_dai 
 
W_but 15.42   2.58  
 
12.84   2.58   
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P_dai  W_smp 13.82   4.09    9.73   4.09   
P_dai  W_wmp 16.77   5.36    11.43   5.36   
P_dai  R_milk 12.49   5.28    7.22   5.28   
P_dai  R_but 11.54   4.77    6.77   4.77   
W_but  R_but 25.51 *** 2.26     21.57 *** 3.94   
Cheese Chain                   
P_che_ind 
 
R_mozz 12.42   3.42   
 
8.99   3.42   
P_che_ind 
 
R_racl 14.67   1.91   
 
12.76   1.91   
P_che_ind 
 
E_melt 17.69   3.96   
 
12.39   3.96   
P_che_art 
 
E_hard 17.73   4.61   
 
13.11   4.61   
P_che_art 
 
E_semi 9.78   3.46   
 
6.33   3.46   
P_che_art 
 
R_app 15.66   4.28   
 
11.38   4.28   
E_semi  R_app 13.08   2.47    10.60   2.47   
P_emm 
 
E_emm 11.62   4.54   
 
7.07   4.54   
P_emm 
 
R_emm 16.03   2.76   
 
13.26   2.76   
E_emm 
 
R_emm 9.20   3.53   
 
5.66   3.53   
P_gru 
 
E_gru 21.03 ** 3.40   
 
17.63 ** 3.40   
P_gru 
 
R_gru 18.85 * 4.03   
 
14.82 * 4.03   
E_gru  R_gru 19.07 * 3.45     15.62 * 3.45   
Organic chain                   
P_org  R_milk_org 18.78 * 5.66    13.12  5.66   
P_org  R_but_org 28.75 *** 6.43    20.32 ** 6.43   
P_org  R_emm_org 12.37   4.87    7.50   4.87   
P_org  R_gru_org 14.71   4.53    10.18   4.53   
P_org   R_mozz_org 13.10   1.67     11.43   1.67   
*/ **/*** represent 10/5/1% significance level ; r= rank, lag length acc. to Schwarz criterion, incl. con-
stant in cointegration, Exog. variables: monthly seasonal dummies 
 
Table A3: Threshold cointegration test results for TAR and MTAR models with 














CI-Vector p2+0.29p1-3.50 p2-0.66p1+1.24 p2-0.40p1-0.17 p2-0.20p1+0.45 p2+0.15p1-1.70 p2-0.59p1+0.27 
model tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar 
lags (k) 1 1 12 12 12 12 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ρ1 (+)  -0.05* -0.01 -0.10* -0.15** -0.15** -0.17*** -0.07 -0.08** -0.10 -0.13** -0.25*** -0.32*** 
ρ2 (-)  -0.03 -0.06** -0.19** -0.10 -0.15** -0.12* -0.07** -0.05 -0.13** -0.11* -0.28*** -0.21*** 
H01: no CI  2.36  3.13  3.86  3.33  3.99  4.17  2.83  2.96  4.36  4.26 10.11*** 10.63*** 
H02: no aPT  0.34  1.83  1.35  0.34  0.00  0.35  0.00  0.26  0.22  0.04  0.06  0.98 
             













P_che_art –        
R_app 
CI-Vector p2-1.05p1+3.85 p2+0.24p1-3.95 p2-0.37p1-0.46 p2-1.01p1+2.06 p2-1.84p1+5.55 p2-0.42p1-1.13 
model tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar 
lags (k) 12 12 2 2 10 10 10 10 12 12 2 3 
ρ1 (+)  -0.08** -0.02 -0.14 -0.12 -0.18 -0.15 -0.06 -0.15** -0.06 -0.08 -0.12** -0.14** 
ρ2 (-)  -0.05 -0.14*** -0.24*** -0.22*** -0.22* -0.24** -0.16** -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 
H01: no CI  2.82  5.83  4.28  4.25 1.92  2.15  2.43  2.45  1.11  1.37  2.52  3.20 
H02: no aPT  0.39  6.20**  0.78  0.72 0.08  0.52  0.99  1.03  0.02  0.54  1.11  1.83 















CI-Vector p2-0.40p1-0.96 p2-0.39p1-1.32 p2-0.10p1-2.73 p2-1.13p1+2.41 p2+0.39p1-4.69 p2-0.27p1-3.68 
model tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar 
lags (k) 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 1 3 3 3 3 
ρ1 (+)  -0.02 -0.04 -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.11** -0.07 -0.17** -0.25*** -0.13 -0.11 -0.15 -0.10 
ρ2 (-)  -0.05* -0.05 -0.12* -0.12* -0.04 -0.08 -0.15** -0.07 -0.17* -0.19** -0.18* -0.23** 
H01: no CI  1.88  1.67  5.05  5.20  2.48  1.91  5.89  8.24**  2.40  2.60  2.40  2.94 
H02: no aPT  0.46  0.04  0.46  0.85  1.13  0.00  0.10  4.47**  0.15  0.55  0.05  1.09 













CI-Vector p2-0.19p1+0.25 p2-0.16p1-0.63 p2-0.10p1-2.58 p2-0.03p1-2.91 p2-0.18p1-0.02   
model tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar tar mtar   
lags (k) 12 12 12 12 5 5 3 3 2 2   
ρ1 (+)  -0.16** -0.20*** -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07**   
ρ2 (-)  -0.17** -0.11 -0.11* -0.20*** -0.04 -0.01 -0.14* -0.12* -0.00  0.04   
H01: no CI  3.82  4.26  1.84  4.77  0.81  1.22  1.91  1.51  0.66  2.56   
H02: no aPT  0.02  0.83  0.36  6.07**  0.08  0.87  1.46  0.67  0.51  4.30**   
*/**/*** represent significance at 10%/5%/1% level 
CI = Cointegration; (M)TAR = (Momentum) Threshold Autoregressive Model; 
H01: no cointegration (ρ1= ρ2=0; Φ-test, with critical values from Wane et al. 2004, assuming 150 observations). 
H02: no asymmetric adjustment (ρ1=ρ2; F-test). Lag length selected by minimizing AIC. 
Table A4: Results from Hansen and Seo Threshold Cointegration Test 
Tested variable pair   Hansen ad Seo (2002) 
        H0: Linear Coint. HA: Threshold Coint. 
Dairy chain lag Test stat. p-value Threshold value 
P_dai 
 
W_but 2 21.00 0.17 6.14 
P_dai  W_smp 2 17.93 0.58 2.54 
P_dai  W_wmp 2 18.30 0.38 0.52 
P_dai  R_milk 2 16.59 0.60 3.32 
P_dai  R_but 2 14.05 0.89 6.08 
W_but  R_but 2 14.68 0.82 0.38 
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Cheese Chain         
P_che_ind 
 
R_mozz 9 46.32 0.49 3.77 
P_che_ind 
 
R_racl 9 46.41 0.60 9.48 
P_che_ind 
 
E_melt 9 49.07 0.35 0.55 
P_che_art 
 
E_hard 2 12.90 0.97 6.05 
P_che_art 
 
E_semi 2 14.82 0.72 4.39 
P_che_art 
 
R_app 3 24.29 0.36 3.18 
P_emm 
 
E_emm 2 14.10 0.86 3.85 
P_emm 
 
R_emm 3 25.91 0.12 0.02 
E_emm 
 
R_emm 3 21.37 0.65 -0.03 
P_gru 
 
E_gru 7 35.52 0.78 3.37 
P_gru 
 
R_gru 7 32.48 0.95 6.26 
E_gru  R_gru 4 28.22 0.32 8.12 
Organic chain         
P_org  R_milk_org 9 50.18 0.22 6.21 
P_org  R_but_org 9 50.59 0.23 3.66 
P_org  R_emm_org 9 49.76 0.27 4.98 
P_org  R_gru_org 9 57.45 0.08 5.97 
P_org   R_mozz_org 9 48.89 0.36 4.42 
Note: lag length acc. to AIC criterion, incl. constant in cointegration, 100 bootstraps, all prices in logarithms, threshold re-
striction: min. 10% of observation within one regime, no seasonal dummies included 
Table A5: Testing for asymmetric error correction in linear VECM models (based on 
Johansen cointegration) 
Tested variable pair  p1   p2  Symm. test 









             
P_dai 
 
W_but 4 -0.04 ** -0.03 (n.s.)  0.02 **  0.02 (n.s.)  (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_dai  W_smp 4 -0.05 (n.s.) -0.03 (n.s.)  0.08 *  0.06 (n.s.)  (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_dai  W_wmp 4 0.01 (n.s.) 0.02 (n.s.)  0.09 ***  0.05 *  (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_dai  R_milk 4 -0.05 ** -0.03 **   0.00 (n.s.)   0.00 (n.s.)   (n.s.) (n.s.) 
Cheese chain          














0.08 (n.s.)   (n.s.) (n.s.) 
E_gru  R_gru 4 -0.07 (n.s.) -0.10 ***  -0.05 (n.s.)  0.01 (n.s.)  (n.s.) (n.s.) 
Organic chain          
 















P_org   R_but_org 2 -0.07 (n.s.) -0.01 (n.s.)   0.12 ***   0.12 ***   (n.s.) (n.s.) 
*/ **/*** represent 10/5/1% significance level; (n.s.) = not significant at 10% level 
Model with prices in logarithms, incl. 11 seasonal dummies, lag selection according to Schwarz criterion. 
Note: model not chosen because no significant asymmetries were detected. 
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Table A6: VAR models short-term asymmetry test 
Tested variable pair Cum. lag asymmetry 
 p1   p2  
p1  p2 
(H05) 
p2  p1 
(H06) 
Dairy chain     
P_dai 
 
W_but (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_dai  W_smp (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_dai  W_wmp (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_dai  R_milk * (n.s.) 
P_dai  R_but (n.s.) (n.s.) 
Cheese Chain   
P_che_ind R_mozz (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_che_ind R_racl (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_che_ind E_melt (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_che_art 
 
E_hard (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_che_art 
 
E_semi (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_che_art 
 
R_app (n.s.) * 
P_emm 
 
E_emm (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_emm 
 
R_emm (n.s.) (n.s.) 
E_emm 
 
R_emm (n.s.) (n.s.) 
Organic chain   
P_org  R_milk_org (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_org  R_but_org * (n.s.) 
P_org  R_emm_org (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_org  R_gru_org (n.s.) (n.s.) 
P_org   R_mozz_org (n.s.) (n.s.) 
*/ **/*** represent 10/5/1% significance level for rejection of the null hy-
pothesis of symmetric adjustment; (n.s.) = not significant at 10% level 
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IV Market Integration and Market Efficiency under Seasonal 
Tariff Rate Quotas 
Author: Judith Hillen 
Published in Journal of Agricultural Economics (Vol. 70, No. 3, 2019, 859–873) 
Abstract 
Switzerland applies seasonal tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for the import of many fruits and vege-
tables during the domestic harvest season. We examine how this system affects the relationship 
between Italian and Swiss tomato prices and test for physical market integration and spatial 
equilibrium conditions over time. We use detailed, transaction-based data on trade flows and 
trade costs and estimate an extended parity bounds model, following Barrett and Li (2002). We 
confirm that in the summer season, when TRQs are in place, markets are inefficient. While 
quota holders receive positive rents, the marginal rents for importers without quota shares are 
negative. This inhibits trade flows above the in-quota import quantity allowed by TRQs. Hence, 
despite leading to inefficiencies and creating rents for importers, seasonal TRQs are effective 
in protecting domestic production against competing imports. 
Keywords: parity bounds model, Switzerland, tariff rate quotas, tomato trade 
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1 Introduction 
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) are two-level tariffs with a low ‘in-quota’ tariff for imports up to a 
defined quota volume and a higher ‘out-of-quota’ tariff charged for all subsequent imports. As 
a result of the tariffication efforts in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs, TRQs were adopted for products previously subject to non-tariff measures, such as 
pure import quotas. Since then, they have been a widely used instrument to control market 
access and are still applied in more than 40 countries, particularly for politically sensitive agri-
cultural products (Beckman et al. 2017, WTO 2018). Non-seasonal TRQs have received con-
siderable research attention, and their mechanisms and economic effects have been studied ex-
tensively (e.g. Boughner et al. 2000, Skully 2001, de Gorter and Kliauga 2006). 
Ever since TRQs were first introduced, economists have heavily criticized the instrument (e.g. 
Abbott and Paarlberg 1998, Gibson et al. 2001, Abbott 2002). This criticism has addressed the 
non-tariff barrier effects that TRQs cause, their complex effects on price stability, the quota 
rents that they generate, and the fact that quota allocation is often non-transparent. Abbott and 
Paarlberg (1998) find that TRQs either mimic pure quotas or function like pure tariffs, depend-
ing on import quantities and how the tariffs and quota volume are set. Switches between these 
two states can occur, so that the mechanism is not always predictable and the effect on price 
stability is uncertain. Moreover, Gibson et al. (2001) state that often ‘mega-tariffs’ (>100%) 
and highly complex tariff line regulations apply, which is contrary to the original TRQ princi-
ples of market access and clear tariffication. Finally, it has been shown conceptually and em-
pirically that quota-holding importers can capture rents (Skully 2001, Abbott 2002). Therefore, 
quota allocation mechanisms are critical, especially if they are non-transparent or discrimina-
tory, as is the case with ‘first-come, first served’ or historical allocation (Skully 2001, de Gorter 
and Kliauga 2006). 
Less research attention has been dedicated to seasonal TRQs, which are only effective during 
domestic supply seasons. Such TRQs are mostly applied for fruit and vegetables, with the aim 
of protecting domestic production from competing imports in season, while allowing a cheap 
import supply out of season (de Gorter and Kliauga 2006). Currently, the European Union, 
Iceland, Norway, South Korea and Switzerland apply seasonal TRQs for several perishable 
fresh fruit and vegetable products (WTO 2018). The analysis of seasonal TRQs is made more 
complicated by the fact that they often do not have fixed yearly quota volumes; instead, the 
yearly quota volume is adjusted depending on market conditions (e.g. the size of the domestic 
harvest). 
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Given their wide application and the lack of previous empirical studies, we analyse how this 
policy instrument affects market integration and market efficiency using the example of Swiss 
tomato imports. Using an extended parity bounds model (PBM) and detailed customs data on 
trade flows, tariff costs and prices, we study how seasonal TRQs applied by Switzerland affect 
Italian–Swiss tomato trade, market integration and rents throughout the year. Section 2 outlines 
the setting and the framework of our analysis. Section 3 explains our data and methods, while 
section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Setting 
Switzerland has a long history of strong border protection for agricultural products. Following 
the Uruguay Round, TRQs replaced the previous instrument of import quotas (Swiss Federal 
Council 1994). The TRQ system for tomatoes is seasonal, as it is for many domestically grown 
fruits and vegetables. Figure 1 schematically illustrates how this TRQ functions.14 During the 
Swiss tomato season, when domestically produced tomatoes are available, the system aims to 
protect domestic production from cheaper import competition. The official policy goals are to 
(a) support farm income by keeping domestic producer prices high, and (b) to ensure domestic 
food supply, as the degree of self-sufficiency is of great concern to Swiss agricultural policy 
(Loi et al. 2016, Ferjani et al. 2018). Outside the Swiss tomato season, the system is designed 
to ensure sufficient supply through imports. The average weekly import volumes for Italian 
round tomatoes in figure 1 show that indeed, only low quantities are imported during the sum-
mer month, and larger volumes of up to 100 tons per week out of season, during winter and 
spring. 
More specifically, from 21 October until 30 April, unlimited tomato imports are allowed at a 
low in-quota tariff of 0.05 CHF/kg or even 0.00 CHF/kg.15 During this time, there is no com-
petition with domestic products, and the quota is not effective (‘non-administered period’). If 
the Swiss tomato harvest starts later than 1 May or ends before 20 October, the Swiss Federal 
Office for Agriculture (FOAG) can prolong the non-administered period. This usually happens 
in May and early October and can vary from year to year. 
 
                                                 
14 For a detailed explanation of the Swiss TRQ system and references to the specific legal texts, see Loi et al. 
(2016). 
15 For imports from EU and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) trade partners there is an additional agree-
ment about duty-free imports. This is limited to 10,000 tons net for all types of tomatoes (TRQ number 106) 
and is only applicable in the non-managed period (Swiss Federal Council 2008). Above this quantity, the in-
quota tariff of 0.05 CHF/kg applies. 
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Figure 1: Applicable tariff rates and import volumes of tomato imports from the EU 
 
In the administered period, there are in-quota and out-of-quota tariffs. There are limited quotas 
for imports at the low in-quota tariff of 0.05 CHF/kg, which is equivalent to 1.4% of the average 
Swiss retail price. Requests for such quotas are discussed and agreed upon on a weekly basis 
by the umbrella organization Swisslegumes, taking into account current domestic production 
and demand estimates. Producers, importers, traders and retailers are represented in this inter-
branch organization. They jointly decide whether and what volume of imports is needed and 
request that FOAG opens a corresponding quota. FOAG then officially releases the quota and 
allocates quota shares to individual importers. Due to these flexible weekly quota openings, 
also the annual quota volume can vary from year to year. 
Quota allocation is calculated based on an importer’s share of the previous year’s domestic 
purchases and imports. Hence, historically large importers get access to large quota shares. 
Historically smaller importers receive proportionally smaller quota shares, and new entrants 
into the market receive no access to quota shares in their first year. Generally, importers fully 
exploit the released quota quantities. Quantities exceeding these quotas can only be imported 
at a high out-of-quota tariff (2.64 CHF/kg, equivalent to 73.9% of the average retail price). If 
there is full supply through domestic production, or even oversupply, no quotas are released in 
the respective week, and a reduced out-of-quota tariff (1.50 CHF/kg, equivalent to 42.0% of 
the average retail price) applies to all imports. This reduced rate is a historical compromise 
without economic justification. 
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Even though only relatively low volumes are imported at these high tariff rates in the adminis-
tered period (see figure 1), they lead to high additional costs for the importers, which are ulti-
mately passed on to Swiss consumers. For tomato imports, these extra tariffs, paid on top of the 
in-quota tariff of 0.05 CHF per kg add up to 259’414 CHF per year on average (for 2011-2015). 
As the yearly quota volume in this Swiss system is flexible and negotiated on a weekly basis, 
the standard textbook analysis of a TRQ (with a fixed quota volume and four possible excess 
demand conditions – no trade, quota not binding, quota binding and quota no longer binding – 
see e.g. Skully 2001) does not apply. The specific Swiss TRQ system has been previously an-
alysed by Loi et al. (2016) and Gray et al. (2017). Both studies suspect the system to generate 
rents that are then captured by the downstream sector, particularly the large retailers. Yet, they 
do not prove the existence or quantify these rents empirically, which is one of the aims of this 
study. 
3 Data and Methods 
3.1 Data 
We combine data on prices, trade costs and trade flows, analysing weekly data from March 
2011 until May 2015, as this is the longest timeframe available. We chose the case of Italian 
tomato imports because in Switzerland tomatoes are the product with the largest volume of 
trade that is subject to seasonal TRQs, and Italy is a major trade partner for which reliable price 
data are available.16 Table 1 gives an overview of our data. 
Price data 
The Swiss domestic tomato season is quite short (from roughly May to September), and do-
mestic producer and wholesale prices are only reported during these months. To construct a 
continuous domestic Swiss retail price series we use retail prices for ordinary, round, red toma-
toes (not cocktail tomatoes, not on the vine, non-organic). For Italy, we use wholesale price 
data, which is the relevant level for international trade. The comparison of Swiss retail and 
Italian wholesale prices leads to a permanent measurement difference in price levels. This 
wholesale-retail marketing margin is considered in the later empirical model. 
                                                 
16 The top three countries of origin for Swiss round red tomato imports (not cocktail, on the vine or organic) are 
Morocco, Spain and Italy. However, only for Italy sufficiently detailed weekly price data are available to con-
duct this analysis. 
IV   Market Integration and Market Efficiency under Seasonal Tariff Rate Quotas 
86 
Table 1: Description of price and trade data for Swiss–Italian tomato trade 
Variable Unit Description Source mean sd 
PCH CHF/kg Swiss retail price FOAG 3.57 0.41 
PIT CHF/kg Italian wholesale price  ISMEA 1.80 0.44 
Tariffavg CHF/kg 
average tariff cost for Italian tomato imports, 
weighted by weekly import volume 
KIC 0.38 0.59 
Tariffmarg CHF/kg 
marginal tariff cost for Italian tomato imports: 
highest tariff rate paid in observed week 




dummy variable for observed trade flows of >5t 
per week 
KIC 0.74 n/a 
Continuous weekly data from March 2011 until May 2015 is used for all variables (220 observations). Mean and 
standard deviation refer to the whole sample data, including administered and non-administered period. 
FOAG = Swiss Federal Office for Agriculture, ISMEA = Italian Service Institute for Agricultural and Food Mar-
kets, KIC = Kontingente Import Controlling (by FOAG), sd = standard deviation. 
Trade volume data 
We use data on Swiss imports of Italian tomatoes derived from a transaction-based import con-
trolling tool administered by the Swiss customs authorities. We only consider non-organic 
round tomatoes with a diameter of less than 80 mm (tariff line 0702.009), excluding tomatoes 
on the vine and cocktail tomatoes. As the database reports country of origin, import volume, 
import value, applied tariff rate and total tariffs paid per individual import transaction 𝑖, we are 
able to calculate the total import volume from Italy and the associated tariff costs in any given 
week 𝑡. In the ensuing empirical analysis, we distinguish between ‘trade’ and ‘no-trade’ peri-
ods. 
Trade cost data 
To correctly represent the complex Swiss TRQ system with its four different tariff rates (0.00 
or 0.05 CHF/kg in-quota, and 1.50 or 2.64 CHF/kg out-of-quota), we distinguish between av-
erage and marginal tariffs. The average tariff is the volume-weighted effectively paid tariff rate, 
which we calculate by weighting the tariff rate applied to an individual import transaction 𝑖 by 







  for all transactions 𝑖 in week 𝑡. (1) 
In contrast, the marginal tariff is defined as the highest observed tariff rate that applied to an 
import transaction in week t. This is the tariff rate that any additional importer would pay. As 
quotas are always filled, in the administered period the marginal tariff rate is de facto the out-
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of-quota tariff (2.56 CHF/kg) or (in weeks without quota openings) the reduced out-of-quota 





(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖)  for all transactions 𝑖  in week 𝑡. (2) 
Overall trade costs (𝑇𝐶) consist of the variable tariff costs, as calculated above, plus other un-
known trade costs, such as transport and marketing costs. We assume that these other costs 










+ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡. (4) 
We do not estimate or approximate these fixed costs but include them as a constant measure-
ment error in the model, as explained in the following section. 
3.2 Parity Bounds Model 
Our study combines trade and price analysis. Following Barrett (2001) we distinguish between 
market integration (i.e. physical trade behaviour) and market efficiency between the trade part-
ners (i.e. the relationship between prices, costs and resulting rents). To do so, we apply a parity 
bounds model (PBM), which was first suggested by Spiller and Huang (1986) and further de-
veloped by Baulch (1997) and Park et al. (2002). We use an extended model specification by 
Barrett and Li (2002), which enables us to combine trade and price data. 
The standard PBM defines three different cases or ‘regimes’, and estimates the probability of 
observing each of these regimes at a given point in time. In the first case, the spatial price 
differential between two markets, here Switzerland (CH) and Italy (IT), is equal to trade cost 
(TC), implying market efficiency with no rents. 
𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝐻 − 𝑃𝑡
𝐼𝑇 = 𝑇𝐶𝑡 (5) 
Alternatively, the price differential can be smaller than the trade cost. In this case, there are no 
profitable spatial arbitrage opportunities. 
𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝐻 − 𝑃𝑡
𝐼𝑇 < 𝑇𝐶𝑡 (6) 
In the third case, the price differential exceeds trade costs. This implies that spatial arbitrage 
opportunities are not fully exploited, positive rents exist, and markets are not efficient. 




𝐼𝑇 > 𝑇𝐶𝑡 (7) 
The inefficiency depicted in equation (7) can occur for numerous reasons such as trade re-
strictions, public price support and non-competitive pricing practices (Baulch 1997, Hranaiova 
and de Gorter 2005). These equations can also be re-written in terms of rents 𝑅𝑡, which are 
equal to, less than or greater than zero for the above three cases, respectively. 
𝑅𝑡 =  𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝐻 − 𝑃𝑡
𝐼𝑇 − 𝑇𝐶𝑡 (8) 
Such rents only explain the spatial efficiency or inefficiency between two markets and do not 
account for trade flows. Following Barrett and Li (2002) we therefore divide each of the three 
cases above into two subcategories depending on whether (a) trade does or (b) does not flow. 
The result is a total of j = 6 regimes, which occur with probability 𝜆𝑗 (see Table 2). 
Whenever trade occurs, markets are physically integrated. If there are no observable trade 
flows, markets are not integrated but segmented, irrespective of their efficiency. In regime 1, 
there is perfect integration, as markets are physically integrated and in an efficient spatial equi-
librium (zero rents). Regimes 3 and 5 describe physically integrated markets but in a state of 
market disequilibrium with positive or negative rents (imperfect integration). Regimes 2 and 6 
represent segmented equilibrium because there is no trade, but this is in line with spatial equi-
librium conditions, as rents for trade would be zero (regime 2) or even negative (regime 6). 
Finally, in regime 4, markets are in segmented disequilibrium because the lack of trade means 
that they are not integrated even though positive rents remain unexploited. 
Table 2: Description of the six possible regimes  
 𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝐻 − 𝑃𝑡
𝐼𝑇 = 𝑇𝐶𝑡 
(𝑅𝑡 = 0) 
𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝐻 − 𝑃𝑡
𝐼𝑇 > 𝑇𝐶𝑡 
(𝑅𝑡 > 0) 
𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝐻 − 𝑃𝑡
𝐼𝑇 < 𝑇𝐶𝑡 















PCH = Swiss price, PIT = Italian price, R = Rent, TC = Trade Cost, λk = Probability of regime k 
Source: own representation, based on Barrett and Li (2002) 
For rent estimation, we allow for a sampling and measurement error 𝑣𝑡, with mean  and vari-
ance 𝑣
2. The potentially non-zero mean  accounts for permanent, time-invariant factors such 
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as the unobservable trade cost components in 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 and the difference between retail (CH) 
and wholesale (IT) price level. The variance parameters account for all other transitory meas-
urement differences or errors. For example, we convert all prices into one currency, even though 
not all exchange rate changes are passed on immediately (Liefert and Persaud 2009), leading to 
temporary errors in our estimates of the difference between Swiss and Italian tomato prices. 
To estimate the probabilities of the regimes, we need to assume some distribution of the data 
generating process, even though this is naturally unknown and not observable. Following the 
PBM literature (Baulch 1997, Barrett and Li 2002) we assume that the rents 𝑅𝑡 are described 
by a half-normal distribution.17  
𝑅𝑡 =  
𝑣𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 (𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑡 > 0)
 𝑣𝑡        (𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑡 = 0)
𝑣𝑡 − 𝑢𝑡 (𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑡 < 0)
  (9) 
For 𝑅𝑡 ≠ 0, we add a positive half-normal error term 𝑢𝑡 with variance 𝑢
2 . This error term is 
independent of the general sampling and measurement error 𝑣𝑡 and reflects the additional var-
iation of positive and negative rents. The result is the following specification of the distribution 














































]]   (regime 5+6, Rt < 0) (12) 
where  is the standard normal density function and Φ is the standard normal cumulative dis-
tribution function. Using these distribution functions, we can define the likelihood of observing 
the sample data {𝑅𝑡, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑡} as 










                                                 
17 Fackler and Goodwin (2001) point out that this is arbitrary, and the results of PBM estimation are known to be 
sensitive to this assumption. However, Figure A1 in the on-line appendix shows that the observed rents’ distri-
bution indeed follows an approximately half-normal pattern if correcting for the constant measurement error. 
Further, we apply a distribution-independent block bootstrapping procedure to our model results (section 4). 
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The variable 𝐴𝑡 takes the value one when trade takes place in week t, and zero otherwise. 𝜆𝑘 
states the probabilities of the six regimes. Maximizing the log-likelihood function in equation 
(13) generates estimates for the error parameters 𝛼, 𝑢 and 𝑣. To do so we use the ‘L-BFGS-
B’ method proposed by Byrd et al. (1995) subject to the constraints 0 ≤ 𝜆𝑘 ≤ 1 and ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝑘 =
1. As a result of the distributional assumptions and the included error terms, the regimes are 
separated by parity bounds that allow for some variation, so that even in the zero rents regimes, 
rents do not need to be precisely zero (see Baulch 1997). 
The key variable in this model is the series of weekly rents (𝑅𝑡). Due to the non-linearity of the 
Swiss TRQ system, we distinguish between average and marginal rents. For average rents, we 
consider volume-weighted weekly average tariff costs (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑣𝑔, equation 1). This reflects 
the average rents realised by the actors who imported tomatoes in that week, either at in-quota 
or out-of-quota tariffs. In contrast, the marginal rents represent the rents realised by the importer 
who paid the highest tariff rate in a given week (𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔, equation 2). We analyse both 
types of rents because average rents tell us about the observed market outcome and marginal 
rents about the outcome for potential market entrants. 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
We see clear seasonal patterns in the Swiss-Italian price difference, tariff costs and trade flows. 
Table 3 and Figure 2 visualize these differences for all analysed variables. In the non-adminis-
tered period when quotas are not effective and borders are open for unlimited tomato imports, 
the average price difference is relatively low at 1.43 CHF/kg and the average applied tariff is 
only 0.03 CHF/kg. During the administered summer period (ca. June–September) when only 
limited amounts of imports enter at the low in-quota tariff, both values increase; the average 
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Table 3:  Summary statistics of observed variables (mean and standard deviation) 
  



































Source: own calculation. The non-administered period includes prolongations. 
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of trade flows. We consider any week in which Switzerland 
imports at least 5 tons of tomatoes from Italy to be a ‘trade week’, and these weeks are shaded 
in Figure 2. We consider weekly imports of fewer than 5 tons to be negligible and the corre-
sponding weeks to be ‘no-trade weeks’.18 From roughly October to June of most years there are 
constant trade flows from Italy to Switzerland, indicating physical market integration. From 
July to September, however, there are (almost) no Italian tomato imports. Hence, during the 
domestic tomato season when TRQs are administered, the Italian and Swiss markets are seg-
mented. 
To determine whether Swiss and Italian tomato markets are efficient, we estimate the rents over 
time. We define rents as the difference between the Swiss and the Italian prices minus the trade 
costs. Trade costs are made up of variable tariff costs plus other fixed transport and marketing 
costs (compare section 3). We observe the tariff costs, but data on the fixed, non-tariff trade 
costs are missing. Furthermore, since we compare Swiss retail prices with Italian wholesale 
prices, the price difference also includes an unobserved positive wholesale-retail marketing 
margin. Due to these unobserved cost components we cannot directly estimate rent levels. How-
ever, if we assume that the non-tariff trade and marketing costs are constant over time (and 
captured in the constant 𝛼, which is jointly estimated with all other parameters in the PBM) 
then we can estimate changes in rents from week to week during our sample period. 
                                                 
18 This threshold is chosen rather arbitrarily, assuming that large commercial imports start at approximately one 
ton per weekday. In shifting this threshold between 3 and 8 tons per week, the results remain qualitatively the 
same. 
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Figure 2: Relationships between price differentials, trade flows and tariff costs 
 
4.2 Parity bounds model estimation results 
Table 4 summarizes the PBM estimation results. As expected, the constant measurement error 
is positive (𝛼 = 1.826), as an estimate of the non-tariff costs and the retail/wholesale markup, 
assumed constant over the period. Looking at the regime probabilities for average rents, there 
are three striking results. First, regimes with positive rents account for more than 60% of the 
total sample period (𝜆3 + 𝜆4). Second, efficient market equilibrium with zero rents is only 
reached in 22.9% of all weeks (𝜆1). Finally, when there are negative rents, no or only negligible 
(fewer than 5 tons) trade takes place, implying that importers react rationally to arbitrage op-
portunities (𝜆6 = 15.7%, while 𝜆5 = 0%). Overall, these results, which are based on weighted 
average tariffs suggest the existence of inefficiencies and large opportunities for positive im-
porter rents over much of the sample period. 
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Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimates of regime frequencies for Italian tomato 
imports 





















































* α is fixed to the level of the estimation with average rents, as marginal rents do not reflect the actual market outcome. ‘No 
trade’ refers to trade volumes of fewer than 5 tons per week. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. 
 
Standard errors are calculated with block bootstrapping (4 blocks of 55 weeks each to cover all seasons, 10,000 bootstrap 
samples). These are robust standard errors for the actual sample distribution, independent of distributional assumptions (Kün-
sch 1989). For average rents, 53 out of the 10,000 simulated samples did not converge in the maximum likelihood estimation 
and were replaced by the original sample. 
 
Analysing rents based on marginal tariffs gives a different picture. The perfect market equilib-
rium with zero marginal rents and trade (𝜆1) accounts for 64.2% of all weeks, and positive 
marginal rents are not observed in any weeks (𝜆3 = 𝜆4 = 0). In weeks with no trade, marginal 
rents are usually negative (𝜆6=24.8%) and at most zero (𝜆2=1.1%). Hence, for non-quota hold-
ers, the applied tariffs are prohibitive. There is no opportunity at all for positive rents, and with 
almost 35%, rents are even negative (𝜆5 + 𝜆6), providing no incentive to enter the market. 
The above estimates resulting from the maximum likelihood estimation are all time-invariant 
over the whole sample period. To better understand the seasonal patterns of the regime preva-
lence, we construct a time-varying variable ?̃?𝑡
𝑘. This binary indicator variable defines which 
regime k has the highest probability of occurring at each point in time t. In times of no or neg-
ligible trade (𝐴𝑡=0), we compare the conditional probabilities of regimes 1, 3 and 5. In times of 
trade (𝐴𝑡=1), we compare the conditional probabilities of regimes 2, 4 and 6.
19 We aggregate 
the variable ?̃?𝑡
𝑘 over the observed years and calculate seasonal averages for each calendar week. 
Figure 3 displays the regime probabilities throughout the year, based on average rents. 
                                                 
19 The exact construction of the variable is derived in Barrett and Li (2002), p. 289. 
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Figure 3: Seasonal regime probabilities for Italian–Swiss tomato trade (average rents) 
Source: Own calculations of time-varying conditional regime probabilities ?̃?𝑡
𝑘, 
aggregated per ISO calendar week. 
Periods of market integration with trade prevail in the non-administered period and its prolon-
gations (October–early June). These periods are most often characterised by positive rents (𝜆3) 
but sometimes also by zero rents (𝜆1). The probability of negative rents is consistently zero. 
In periods of no trade (i.e. in the administered period in summer), regime 2, in which markets 
are efficient and rents equal zero is never observed (𝜆2=0). Instead, when quotas are released 
and in-quota imports prevail, average rents are most likely to be positive (𝜆4). Later on in the 
administered period, when there is full domestic supply and no quotas are opened, particularly 
mid-July until early September, average rents become negative (𝜆6) because the high out-of-
quota tariffs apply to all imports. 
 
Figure 4: Seasonal regime probabilities for Italian–Swiss tomato trade (marginal rents) 
Source: Own calculations of time-varying conditional regime probabilities ?̃?𝑡
𝑘, 
aggregated per ISO calendar week. 
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Looking at marginal rents, however, the situation is different (Figure 4). During the winter 
months, there is a 100% probability that marginal rents are zero (𝜆1 = 1), indicating that mar-
kets are in equilibrium and additional importers are free to enter the market. During the potential 
prolongation periods (May, October), rents are more often zero (𝜆1 > 0.5) than negative (𝜆5 <
0.5). Finally, in times of no trade in the summer months, marginal rents are always negative 
(𝜆6). This suggests that quotas are binding and any additional imports would yield negative 
rents, providing no incentive for traders who do not hold quota shares to be active on the market. 
4.3 Limitations 
All the above estimates should be interpreted with care and seen as approximations rather than 
precise numerical results. Tests with simulated data and block bootstrapping procedures show 
that for relatively small sample sizes (in our case 220 observations), our model does converge 
to the true parameters without systematic bias but with some imprecision. The bootstrapped 
robust standard errors (Table 4) demonstrate that the estimates are significant, but display large 
variances. In particular, an imprecise estimate of the constant measurement error (𝛼 = 1.826, 
with robust standard error = 0.222) could bias our results. 𝛼 captures the constant measurement 
gap between wholesale and retail prices, as well as constant, non-tariff trade costs, and it is 
estimated based on distributional assumptions (see section 3). If 𝛼 is overestimated, all rents 
are underestimated. The above described rent distribution would shift upward, with less nega-
tive and more positive rents. Analogously, underestimating 𝛼 would mean that true rents are 
constantly lower than our results. In either case, this would affect only the overall level of rents 
and not their seasonal distribution. Hence, our conclusions regarding the administered and non-
administered periods would still hold. For marginal rents, we do not re-calculate 𝛼 but take the 
value estimated from the average rents because our distributional assumptions are valid for 
actually observed rents and not for their marginal behaviour. 
A further limitation of our study concerns the question of who actually captures the rents. The 
rent is generated at the stage of the importers. Previous studies have looked at TRQ systems 
with respect to industry competition and market power (e.g. Scoppola 2010, Pouliot and Larue 
2012). In Switzerland, the large retailers import directly and hold import quotas themselves. 
Additionally, they are supplied by different importing companies. Because of this vertical inte-
gration and multiple supply relationships, we suspect but cannot prove that at least part of the 
importer rents are captured by downstream retailers. 
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5 Discussion and Conclusion 
We analysed tomato trade from Italy to Switzerland under a seasonal TRQ system. Incorporat-
ing detailed price, trade flow and cost data, we examine market integration (i.e. physical trade) 
and market efficiency (i.e. rent generation). We conclude that seasonal TRQs for tomato im-
ports succeed in protecting high-cost domestic production in Switzerland, but at the cost of 
large inefficiencies. 
Our analysis shows that both market integration and market efficiency differ between the ad-
ministered summer period and the non-administered winter period. In the non-administered 
period, only the low in-quota tariff applies and causes little market distortion, so that markets 
are mostly in equilibrium with zero rents for importers. During this time, there are unrestricted 
large import flows and importers are free to enter the market. This is politically desired, as there 
is no domestic tomato production to be protected, and consumers benefit from a large variety 
of low-cost imports. 
During the administered period, however, the TRQ system functions like a flexible quota. 
Cheap in-quota imports are only allowed when there is a domestic supply shortage, and these 
quotas are completely filled. The quota holders benefit from large rents, while marginal rents 
are negative, so above-quota imports are unattractive and the quota is binding. As quota shares 
are allocated based on historical purchase volumes, only the large established players profit, 
while new market entrants are kept out of the market. This mechanism is reinforced by the fact 
that private market players, via their participation in the umbrella organization Swisslegumes, 
themselves determine when and how many quotas will be opened. Therefore, the system con-
tributes to maintaining the status quo of high market concentration among importers and retail-
ers. 
Eventually, Swiss consumers pay the price for this seasonal protection through high retail prices 
during the administered period. Indeed, for Swiss consumers domestic tomatoes are more ex-
pensive in season than imported tomatoes out of season. Swiss tomato producers clearly benefit, 
as the price gap to foreign markets (here Italy) increases substantially during the administered 
domestic season, and the Swiss price becomes completely detached from foreign market devel-
opments. The seasonal administration maintains high and stable domestic prices as long as there 
are Swiss tomatoes on the market. Furthermore, maintaining high prices and limiting imports 
ensures that there is domestic production in the first place and thus contributes to the goal of 
higher self-sufficiency. However, TRQs specifically and border protection in general are cer-
tainly not the most targeted and efficient means of supporting farm incomes, as stressed by 
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Gray et al. (2017). And it can be questioned whether increasing self-sufficiency for a non-staple 
food product such as tomatoes justifies the many market distortions and inefficiencies associ-
ated with the TRQ system, especially because Switzerland remains fully import dependent out 
of season. 
Comparing our findings for seasonal TRQs with previous studies on non-seasonal TRQs, we 
conclude the following. The criticism of non-seasonal TRQs also applies to seasonal TRQs 
during the administered periods. The goal of tariffication is not reached, as the seasonal TRQ 
mimics a pure quota and thus represents a non-tariff barrier. In addition, quota-holders capture 
large rents, and the historical allocation mechanism is discriminatory against new market en-
trants. In contrast with non-seasonal TRQs, however, the seasonal administration limits these 
distortions and inefficiencies to the few months each year in which there is domestic production. 
Moreover, the consensual weekly quota openings coordinated by Swisslegumes in the admin-
istered period allow the system to flexibly react to domestic supply conditions by adjusting 
imports quantities. This makes the instrument attractive for fresh produce with limited storabil-
ity. The distinction between administered and non-administered periods also makes price sta-
bility effects more predictable than under normal TRQs. During the administered period, do-
mestic prices are high, stable and insulated from foreign developments. For the rest of the year, 
international price signals can be passed on through almost unrestricted trade. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Swiss tariff rates for tomato imports from the EU 
Product  
description 
Tariff Nr. Description Timeframe 
(month/day) 
Tariff (CHF 
per kg gross) 
round tomatoes, 
diameter <80 mm 






0702.0091 in-quota tariff 05/01-10/20 0.05 
0702.0099 out-of-quota tariff 05/01-10/20 2.64 
0702.0099 
reduced out-of-quota 
tariff (during full sup-
ply period) 
05/01-10/20 1.50 
Source: Swiss Federal Customs Administration 
*Duty free imports are granted for EU/EFTA imports up to 10'000 t net p.a. (for all tomatoes, TRQ nr. 106) 
Figure A1: Density function of the observed average rents 
 
Source: own representation of observed weekly average rents, defined as 𝑅𝑡
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V Concluding Remarks 
The overall objective of this dissertation is to contribute to a better understanding of agricultural 
and food price transmission in Switzerland. To do so, the articles in the three previous chapters 
provided empirical analyses of Swiss prices. The studying of horizontal and vertical price trans-
mission in the Swiss milk market was complemented by an analysis of market integration and 
market efficiency under the Swiss seasonal tariff rate quota (TRQ) system. This final chapter 
summarizes the results, indicates how far the original research questions are answered and 
brings up issues that might merit further investigation. 
1 Summary of the results 
The first article, “Protecting the Swiss milk market from foreign price shocks: Public border 
protection vs. quality differentiation,” dealt with spatial price transmission between German 
and Swiss milk markets. We investigated both cheese and dairy products at wholesale and pro-
ducer levels. We showed that the price pass-through from Germany to Switzerland is higher for 
raw milk producer prices than for processed products’ wholesale prices, even though raw milk 
is not traded between the two countries. At the wholesale level, cheese trade is fully liberalized 
whereas other dairy products are still subject to tariffs and TRQs. At both producer and whole-
sale level, German prices influence Swiss prices more in the tariff-protected industrial dairy 
processing channel than for liberalized cheese products. This may seem surprising, but it is not 
only the level of trade protection that differs between dairy and cheese products. For Swiss 
cheese, there is a high degree of quality differentiation, for both the raw milk (e.g., silage-free 
feeding, regional restrictions) and the actual product processing (e.g., artisanal production, spe-
cialty brands). Other dairy products such as milk powder or butter are considered more homo-
geneous and are made from generic pasteurized milk. Our results indicate that this qualitative 
differentiation limits spatial price transmission between Switzerland and Germany, because in-
ternational substitutability is reduced. For the analyzed milk products, this aspect seems to be 
more relevant than the type or degree of border protection or the physical trade volume. We 
interpret this finding as evidence that qualitative product differentiation by producers and pro-
cessors contributes more than public trade policies to segmenting the Swiss market from the 
surrounding EU market. 
The second article, “Vertical price transmission in Swiss dairy and cheese value chains,” as-
sessed how milk prices are passed on within Switzerland along the processing lines. We found 
only weak price links along Swiss dairy and cheese chains, i.e., between producer, wholesale, 
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export and retail prices of a respective product. Neither for dairy nor for cheese products, con-
vincing evidence for long-run vertical price transmission could be found. Especially the initial 
hypothesis that prices are passed on more fully and quickly in artisanal cheese value chains 
with high price transparency than in industrialized, highly concentrated dairy chains could not 
be confirmed. We found (threshold) cointegration only for six out of 24 price pairs, not allowing 
us to draw a clear conclusion because cointegration was partly found in the dairy chain (butter), 
cheese chain (Gruyère) and organic chain (organic milk and butter). These results are contrary 
to most previous findings for milk markets in other countries, because most of them showed 
evidence for long-run price transmission with asymmetries regarding the pass-through of price 
increases or decreases. Our analysis did not reveal any systematic asymmetries and showed 
almost no long-run vertical price transmission in Swiss milk markets. This finding could be due 
to statistical properties and limited data availability of our price series or to Switzerland-specific 
factors such as the fragmented farm structure, high governmental support and the overall high 
price and cost levels in Switzerland. 
The third article, “Market integration and market efficiency under seasonal tariff rate quotas,” 
dealt with Switzerland’s seasonal TRQ system. It examined how this system affects the rela-
tionship between Italian and Swiss tomato prices and trade patterns. Incorporating detailed 
price, trade flow and tariff cost data, we analyzed market integration (i.e., physical trade) and 
market efficiency (i.e., rent generation). The study showed large differences between the ad-
ministered summer period and the non-administered winter period, regarding both market inte-
gration and market efficiency. Outside the Swiss tomato season, TRQs are not administered 
and only the low in-quota tariff applies, causing little market distortion. During this time, mar-
kets are mostly in equilibrium with zero rents for importers. There are constantly large import 
volumes, and importers are free to enter the market. This situation is politically desired because 
there is no domestic tomato production to be protected and consumers benefit from a large 
variety of low-cost imports. In the summer season, however, when TRQs are in place, markets 
are inefficient. The price gap to Italy increases substantially, and the Swiss price becomes com-
pletely detached from foreign market developments. This independence allows Swiss producers 
to sell their produce at high, stable prices, without having to fear competition from cheap im-
ports. Whereas import quota holders receive positive rents, the marginal rents for importers 
without access to quota shares are negative. This inhibits trade flows above the in-quota import 
quantity allowed by TRQs. Hence, despite leading to inefficiencies and creating rents for im-
porters, seasonal TRQs are an effective and flexible instrument to shield domestic production 
against competing imports. 
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Overall, this thesis has shown that Swiss agricultural and food markets remain characterized by 
high prices and segmented from the surrounding EU markets. This is at least partly due to the 
protective trade policies. Especially the seasonal TRQ system shields Swiss producers from 
international price signals and from any foreign competition. There is no need for producers to 
operate competitively or to react to price signals. The system ensures that they can sell their 
products at high prices, and therefore it increases their farm income. Although beneficial for 
domestic producers, this system leads to inefficiencies, in particular to high rents for importers 
and even higher prices for consumers. It is questionable whether such a complex, costly, and 
trade-distorting system is the right tool to ensure domestic production and to support domestic 
farm income. 
In fact, the case of the liberalized cheese markets shows that there are other ways to maintain 
high and stable prices, such as the promotion of high-quality differentiated products. Compared 
with players in the tariff-protected industrial dairy processing line, producers and processors in 
the cheese value chains realize higher prices and are less dependent on international price de-
velopments. With the help of some general, non-trade-distorting subsidies, they manage to be 
competitive internationally despite high production costs. They sustain their position in the 
Swiss market against cheaper, duty-free imports and are successful in export markets. From a 
policy perspective, these findings suggest a benefit in preferring decoupled subsidies and direct 
payments over tariff-based protectionism. Governmental support could help to position Swiss 
products in high-quality segments and to communicate this quality accordingly. 
2 Outlook on future research 
Based on the outcome of the three articles in this thesis, but even more based on the research 
process itself, I would like to stress two aspects that I consider to deserve further investigation: 
first, the role of market structure and market power, and second, an extension of the used price 
data. 
This thesis does not explicitly analyze the role of Swiss market structure in price transmission 
or price setting in general. However, market structure and potentially resulting market power 
are relevant elements to understand both vertical and horizontal price transmission (e.g., 
McCorriston et al. 1998, Bakucs et al. 2014). This is also true for Switzerland, where already 
in 1992 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) suspected 
“widespread horizontal and vertical collusive arrangements” to contribute to higher and more 
rigid prices than in neighboring countries (OECD 1992, p. 68). The OECD’s most recent study 
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confirms the viewpoint that the high price level is partly “driven by weak competition” (OECD 
2017, p. 87). 
Besides concentration, i.e., the number of players in the market, the degree of cooperation and 
the network among these players are crucial. In the relatively small Swiss market, sector asso-
ciations and umbrella organizations play an important role (SECO 2008, Reviron et al. 2017). 
Therefore, a simple measuring of concentration ratios or market shares will not be sufficient. 
Future research could focus on the role of these coordinating organizations, analyzing their role 
in vertical price transmission and whether a higher degree of cooperation leads to higher and 
more stable prices. Moreover, there are many interdependencies between governmental policy 
makers and these private market organizations. A clear separation between public policy and 
private market power is not always easy: The milk quota system, officially abolished in 2009, 
has for example been followed by a private law quota system, organized by the sector associa-
tion. Also, in the seasonal TRQ system, private market players decide upon timing and volume 
of quota openings, as described in chapter IV. Making a clear public–private distinction or 
modeling the interdependencies will be a challenge. Tackling this field requires combining the 
econometric approaches used in classical price transmission with market structure analysis and 
with methods from the field of New Empirical Industrial Organizations (e.g., Weldegebriel 
2004, Hong and Li 2017). 
The second point I would like to highlight is that all of the three analyses suffer to some degree 
from data limitations. Whereas in this thesis monthly (chapters II and III) or at most weekly 
data (chapter IV) are used, higher frequency data (e.g., daily data) would help to get more ob-
servations for the same time period, to lose less information through timely aggregation and 
consequently to get better estimation results. Also, price data with less aggregation across prod-
uct groups could lead to additional insights. Especially in the third article, dealing with fresh 
vegetable prices, we had to work with aggregate product prices for a certain type of tomatoes. 
Yet, these tomatoes and their prices are still highly heterogeneous, because they vary in quality, 
maturity, package size, greenhouse vs. outdoor production, etc. All price data are from second-
ary sources, making it difficult to determine how large the variance in prices really is and how 
this aggregation took place. 
Having to deal with such non-ideal secondary source price data has led me to pursue a new 
research focus. Based on this experience, I started to integrate the process of price data collec-
tion into my own research. Collecting price data through web scraping is one approach that 
could help to overcome some of the data limitations of currently used price data sources 
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(Cavallo and Rigobon 2016, Hillen 2018). The term web scraping describes the automated pro-
cess of accessing websites and downloading specific information, such as prices (Edelman 
2012). Especially at the retail stage, scraping price data from grocery shopping websites gives 
access to higher frequency and more detailed price data on a single product basis. Like in many 
other countries, online grocery shopping is playing an increasing role in the Swiss retail sector. 
Both start-ups and the large established retailers have launched online shopping websites with 
home delivery service, recording growing shares in the grocery retail landscape (Lang 2019). 
Retrieving price quotes from these websites leads to price data for more products, at a higher 
frequency (e.g., daily) with more information on product attributes (e.g., organic vs. conven-
tional, Swiss vs. imported products). Using such scraped data could help not only to validate 
and to challenge the analyses made in this thesis but also to extend them by investigating the 
role of the growing online food retail sector with respect to price transmission and market inte-
gration. 
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